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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 On April 28, 2009, the late former Pennsylvania senator, Arlen Specter, 
stated, "As the Republican Party has moved farther and farther to the right, I have 
found myself increasingly at odds with the Republican philosophy and more in 
line with the philosophy of the Democratic Party." At the same time, he informed 
the electorate that he was switching party affiliation and would run as a Democrat 
in the 2010 election (Hulse, 2009).  Senator Specter’s decision to switch political 
affiliation was met with much controversy and discussion.  He lost a lot of 
support from his Republican comrades and also failed to win over enough 
Democratic support to win the 2010 Pennsylvania senate race.  Perhaps the most 
substantial reason Mr. Specter’s decision was met with such contention was due 
to how we think about and identify with our political affiliations and orientations.  
People often identify strongly with their political orientations and consider them 
an important part of their personal identity (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009).  This 
devotion to political ideology, especially in the United States, can often result in 
individuals equating political opinions with moral truth and righteousness, which 
can lead to such consequences as intolerance for different political viewpoints, 
distrust in legitimate authorities (e.g. Supreme Court) to make the right decision, 
and reduced cooperation with attitudinally dissimilar others (Morgan, Skitka, & 
Wisneski, 2010; Skitka, 2010; Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Skitka, Bauman, & 
Sargis, 2005; Skitka & Mullen, 2002). 
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 The two main political parties in the United States, Republicans (typically 
considered conservatives) and Democrats (typically considered liberals) have 
become increasingly at odds with one another philosophically over the past 
decade (Van Boven, Judd, & Sherman, 2012), which causes one to wonder how 
liberals and conservatives can be that different in so many aspects of their values, 
beliefs, and views on public policy issues.  More importantly, is there a way that 
we can coherently make sense of the ideological differences between liberals and 
conservatives and come to a greater understanding of how and why individuals 
might differ in regards to their ideologies, morals, and values?  Moral 
Foundations Theory (MFT, Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) offers 
a psychological lens through which to examine the political divide in America.  
Distinguishing political conservatives and liberals based on their moral concerns, 
Haidt and Graham (2007) were able to show, through correlation analyses, that 
different groupings of these moral concerns are associated with different ends of 
the political spectrum.  While much research has been generated through the lens 
of Moral Foundations Theory, the fact that no explicit experimental test of the 
theory has been conducted places limitations on the amount one can extrapolate 
from the theory. This paper will explore research regarding morality, specifically 
Moral Foundations Theory, political ideology, abstract values, how they are all 
related, and how the proposed research will help to fill in the missing pieces by 
providing an experimental test of the link between Moral Foundations Theory and 
political ideology. 
Morality 
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 Research on morality within the domain of psychology garnered a lot of 
attention primarily due to the work of Lawrence Kohlberg (1969).  He proposed a 
cognitive-developmental approach to study moral development in children and 
essentially equated moral development to a form of cognitive development.  By 
presenting children, at different developmental levels, with different moral 
dilemmas to solve, Kohlberg was able to trace a developmental and incremental 
growth in moral reasoning. He identified six stages of moral development 
incorporated into three distinct levels (two stages per level) ranging from 
preconventional to conventional to postconventional or autonomous.  In the 
preconventional stage, children base their moral decisions (decisions about right 
and wrong) on anticipated punishment or reward and are mostly concerned about 
direct consequences of actions.  Inherent within this level is a more selfish 
component to reasoning and behavior.  In the conventional stage, individuals shift 
their basis for determining right and wrong for their actions from direct 
consequences to how well those actions fit with the rules and guidelines of the 
society, which includes the family, other important groups, or even macro-level 
groups like the nation in which one lives.  The postconventional stage goes even 
further beyond immediate consequences or group expectations and rules to define 
moral values in terms of universal and objective principles of justice.  Most 
adolescents were not expected to reach the postconventional stage of moral 
development (Haidt, 2008, Kohlberg, 1969, Kohlberg, 1975). 
 The cognitive-developmental approach put forth by Kohlberg (1969) was 
not met without criticism.  Carol Gilligan (1982, 1995) proposed an alternative to 
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the culmination of moral maturity being an ethic of justice.  By examining 
differences between boys and girls in their moral development, she discovered 
that girls tended to develop an ethic of care, emphasizing responsibility toward 
others, as opposed to an ethic of justice, emphasizing respecting basic rights of 
others, as the culmination of moral responsibility.  She still proposed a stage-like 
development going from selfishness/conventionality to 
selflessness/postconventionality resulting with a principled morality that is mainly 
concerned with care for close others and maintaining an interdependent and 
egalitarian relationship with close others as well.  If either person within this 
relationship is affronted, then the relationship is inherently harmed, so the ethic of 
care serves to keep relationships and concerns for others and self in balance 
(Gilligan, 1982; 1995). 
 In response to the developmental trajectory approach to moral 
development, Turiel (1983) developed a domain theory of social knowledge, 
which divides this knowledge into three distinct domains: personal, conventional, 
and moral.  His research showed that children as young as 5 years old could make 
distinctions between these different domains and that a sense of morality does not 
necessarily develop after preconventional and conventional stages, but that all 
three domains develop in their owns ways and usually at the same time.  The 
personal domain consists of concerns about one’s own welfare.  The conventional 
domain consists of fluid and context dependent knowledge about social norms 
and group interests.  Since this knowledge is not specifically tied to human 
welfare, these norms and interests can be adjusted to fit specific environments or 
 5	  
situations as need be.  The moral social domain, however, consists of universal 
and objective principles that all people should abide by.  These rules exist to 
protect people from harm and are associated with the ethics of justice and care as 
put forth by Kohlberg (1969) and Gilligan (1982) (Haidt, 2008; Nucci, Turiel, & 
Encarnacion-Gawrych, 1983; Sverdlik, Roccas, & Sagiv, 2012; Turiel, 1983). 
 The social domain approach to morality created a break from the typical 
cognitive-developmental strategy for moral development and understanding, thus 
creating an avenue for further exploration and criticism.  One criticism about the 
theories of morality and moral development put forth by Kohlberg (1969) and 
Turiel (1983) was that the individual was the locus of concern inherent in their 
theories.  Moral concerns were concerns tied to protecting individuals, from either 
harm (ethic of care) or unfairness (ethic of justice) (Haidt, 2008; Shweder, Much, 
Mahapatra, & Park, 1997; Sverdlik et al., 2012).  Cross-cultural research 
conducted with Hindu Indians revealed that moral concerns could be expanded to 
domains beyond the cares and concerns of the individual.  The ethic of autonomy, 
ethic of community, and ethic of divinity were developed in order to broaden the 
moral domain to include common concerns imbued with a sense of right and 
wrong that appear in collectivistic and non-Western cultures (Shweder et al., 
1997). 
The ethic of autonomy encapsulates the typical individual concerns like 
individual rights, fairness, justice, and personal freedom, which are all morally 
good things that help to establish and promote individual dignity and worth.  
People are obligated to care about these concepts because each individual is a 
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person.  The ethic of community transcends the individual and uses concepts like 
institutions, groups, families, tribes, etc. as the basis of moral concern and 
obligation.  Since individuals are parts of communities and various other groups, 
they are obligated to care about and promote the concepts and roles that 
perpetuate a sense of community or society, such as duty, respect, loyalty, and 
interdependence, which all serve to help a society function.  The ethic of divinity 
functions off of the presupposition that individuals have souls and that God or 
gods exist and these two concepts are inextricably linked.  Because of this, 
individuals are obligated to keep their bodies (which house their souls) from 
falling into degradation through spiritual pollution related to such contaminants as 
sexual perversion, certain foods, and spiritual impurities.  The basic premise in 
the ethic of divinity is the understanding that individuals are humans, not beasts, 
and therefore, should be obligated to engage in a type of spiritual self-control to 
protect the sacredness of the human soul (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Shweder, 2003; 
Shweder et al., 1997). 
In response to the expansion of the moral domain by Shweder et al. 
(1997), Haidt and Joseph (2004) set out to make even further distinctions between 
different possible moral domains and to try to define the psychological systems 
that give rise to different moral concerns and intuitions throughout the world.  
They discovered at least five different moral domains, each with their own 
psychological function and possible evolutionary history, which inform moral 
intuitions across cultures: Care/Harm, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, 
Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity (Moral Foundations Theory, Haidt & 
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Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004).  These five foundations (discussed in more 
detail in the next section) consistently map onto Shweder et al.’s (1997) ethics: 
Care and Fairness with the ethic of autonomy, Ingroup and Authority with the 
ethic of community, and Purity with the ethic of divinity.  However, by parsing 
out the ethics into these more specific foundations, Haidt and Joseph (2004) were 
able to speak to the psychological mechanisms underlying moral discourse and 
judgment across cultures (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). 
One goal of Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & 
Joseph, 2004) is to provide a useful way to explain moral conflicts by 
descriptively defining how moral concerns may vary across individuals and 
cultures.  One area where this explanatory utility has been pursued is in the realm 
of political partisanship in the United States.  I will now turn to explaining the 
contribution of Moral Foundations Theory to the realm of political psychology 
and further explain the role of the five moral foundations in relation to political 
ideology and orientation. 
Moral Foundations Theory 
It is often the case that disagreements based on differences in political 
orientation quickly turn into arguments implicating a level of morality, or sense of 
right and wrong.  Because of this, it is helpful to understand political ideology and 
political differences in light of specific moral concerns. Moral Foundations 
Theory (MFT, Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) provides a way to 
explain the liberal/conservative divide in American politics by examining the 
endorsement of specific, intuitive moral concerns (Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Graham, 
 8	  
2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004).  According to MFT, conservatives believe that 
people need the constraints provided by such institutions as authority and tradition 
due to human beings’ inherent selfish tendencies.  Traditions and hierarchical 
structures help to provide a role for each echelon of society and maintain social 
order.  Liberals, on the other hand, often take a more optimistic view of humanity 
and emphasize personal freedom and autonomy to pursue their own course of 
maturity and development (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Sowell, 2002).  Haidt 
(2008) expands on these points and incorporates the moral domain by specifying 
the functions of moral systems: values, institutions, and psychological 
mechanisms that function to regulate selfishness. 
The Moral Foundations broadly fall into two categories of moral systems 
whose functions serve to suppress selfishness: the individualizing approach and 
the binding approach (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 2012; Haidt, Graham, & 
Joseph, 2009).  The individualizing moral system works to suppress individuals’ 
selfish tendencies directly by protecting individuals so that they are the center of 
moral value and concern.  These moral concerns revolve around preventing 
individual harm and treating individuals fairly (Graham et al., 2009; Sowell; 
2002).  The binding approach to suppressing selfishness invokes a moral system 
that places the group [e.g. the family (Graham et al., 2011)] at the center of moral 
value, at times at the expense of the individual.  Strengthening institutions and 
placing individuals into roles and specific duties within a hierarchical structure 
helps to bind individuals into a shared, group-centered moral value (Graham et 
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al., 2009).  Moral Foundations Theory divides the five moral foundations into 
these two broad moral systems. 
Individualizing Foundations 
 Care/Harm.  The Care/Harm foundation is perhaps the most 
straightforward of all of the moral foundations. The primary moral concerns 
related to this foundation revolve around caring for the individual and preventing 
harms to the individual, both from other individuals and from society as a whole 
(Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 2012).  In addition, the Care/Harm foundation 
emphasizes the need to care for those who are suffering and in need.  Feelings of 
sympathy, compassion, and nurturance are common among those who endorse 
this foundation (Haidt & Graham, 2007). 
 Fairness/Reciprocity.  The Fairness/Reciprocity foundation elaborates on 
Trivers’ (1971) research on reciprocal altruism where he noted that evolution 
created a specific kind of altruism in humans where a condition of repayment was 
needed from other individuals in order for any continued kindness to ensue 
(Haidt, 2012; Trivers, 1971).  In short, this evolution created desire for mutual 
cooperation between individuals within a society. The Fairness/Reciprocity 
foundation makes individuals especially sensitive to acts of cheating or attempts 
to take advantage of others (Haidt, 2012).  Taking this into account, participation 
in reciprocal interactions over time and the development of role-taking has 
enabled those who endorse this foundation to place extreme consideration on 
individual rights and equality among people within a society (Haidt, 2012; Haidt 
& Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004).  A recent demonstration of the 
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Fairness/Reciprocity foundation can be found within the Occupy Wall Street 
movement. Individuals in the lower “99%” of income earners were upset with the 
top “1%” of wealthy business men and women whom they felt exploited those at 
the bottom while being unwilling to pay their fair share of taxes.  However, on the 
other side of the spectrum, the Tea Party movement came into existence as a 
reaction to what was perceived as inequality coming from the side of liberal 
Democrats who were seen as socialists trying to take money from hard-working 
Americans and redistribute it to undeserving, lazy individuals on welfare and to 
illegal immigrants through free health care and education (e.g. the Dream Act) 
(Haidt, 2012). 
Binding Foundations 
 Ingroup/Loyalty.  Human beings’ tendency to live within, and interact 
regularly with only a handful of others outside of familial relationships has led to 
the development of specific capacities for relating to and trusting those within our 
tight-knit circles (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004).  At the same 
time, this trust and investment in an individual’s ingroup concurrently fosters a 
distrust and suspicion of other groups and its members.  The valuation of the 
ingroup also promotes valuing sacrifice for the good of the ingroup by its 
members through acts that promote patriotism, loyalty, and even heroism, which 
are highly cherished.  Any acts of betrayal by group members are viewed as 
morally wrong and collectively shunned by the ingroup members (Haidt & 
Graham, 2007). Through the promotion of group membership obligations, 
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individuals within the group are “bound” into promoting an ethic of care for all of 
the ingroup members (Graham, 2010). 
 Authority/Respect.  Many, if not most, cultures in the world have 
developed some sort of hierarchical social system within ingroups (Haidt & 
Graham, 2007; Joseph, Graham, & Haidt, 2009).  While some non-human species 
rely on physical force and fear in order to maintain a dominant/subordinate 
hierarchical structure, humans have developed a hierarchical structure based more 
on respect for superiors and voluntary deference to authority figures (Henrich & 
Gil-White, 2001).  This respect for authority figures and superiors also extends 
into a respect for wisdom, both from those in power and from the past in the form 
of traditions and rituals (Haidt & Joseph, 2004).  As much as authority tends to be 
respected within many cultures, subordination has earned valuation due to being 
associated with such virtues as duty and obedience (Haidt & Graham, 2007).  
Another key element of the Authority/Respect foundation involves the protection 
of subordinates that is socially required of those in a place of superiority.  The 
code of ethics for leaders involves maintaining such virtues as benevolence and 
wisdom for his/her subordinates. Bad leaders are those who are exploitative, 
autocratic, or incompetent for the duties of his/her position and standing within a 
group or society (Graham et al., 2011; Haidt & Graham, 2007).  Hierarchy 
consisting of voluntary respect for authority enables individuals to fit into specific 
roles and duties within a group or society so that people are “bound” together 
through obligations set forth in the maintenance and promotion of the hierarchy, 
thus promoting stability within a society (Haidt, 2008; Haidt, 2012). 
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 Purity/Sanctity.  The Purity/Sanctity foundation primarily consists of 
concerns related to, and in response to, feelings of disgust (Haidt & Graham, 
2007).  Feelings of disgust can be a reaction to physical appearances (e.g. obesity 
or deformity), occupations and social status (e.g. those in a lower-ranked social 
status), or relationships (e.g. homosexuality) (Haidt & Graham, 2007).  There is 
also a heavy reliance on promoting spiritual ideals of sacredness and purity to rule 
the individual instead of bodily passions (e.g. greed, lust, and sloth) (Haidt, 2008; 
Haidt & Joseph, 2004).  By focusing on such spiritual endeavors, individuals 
within a group or society are able to disinhibit inherent selfish tendencies and 
promote a group-minded ideal of self-control and restraint.  From the perspective 
of individuals who endorse the Purity/Sanctity foundation, immorality stems from 
engaging in behaviors that are not seen as spiritually guided or pure, and falling 
into the trap of selfishly enslaving oneself to carnal desires (Haidt, 2008; Haidt, 
2012; Haidt & Graham, 2007). 
Political Ideology 
 Political ideology can be defined as a system of beliefs that individuals use 
to help them interpret the world as they see it (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009).  In 
addition to interpreting the way things currently are, adhering to an ideology helps 
to layout a framework for reaching ideals of how things ought to be (Huckfeldt, 
Mondak, Craw, & Mendez, 2005; Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008).  In light of this 
definition, the divide in the United States over political opinions becomes a little 
clearer.  The ideals that are trying to be reached through public policies depend on 
who is proposing them.  Conservatives tend to emphasize such values as 
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traditionalism and individualism while liberals tend to emphasize upholding such 
values as egalitarianism and universalism (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Henry & 
Reyna, 2007; Katz & Hass, 1988; Schwartz, 1996). 
This differentiation in value endorsement for each side of the political 
spectrum can manifest in the way that liberals and conservatives make attributions 
for individual behavior.  Conservatives tend to make more dispositional 
attributions for individual behavior and life outcomes, meaning that most of the 
fault for an individual’s standing and lot in life is more of a direct result of 
individual choices, determination, and motivations (Henry & Reyna, 2007; 
Reyna, Henry, Korfmacher, & Tucker, 2006). On the other hand, liberals tend to 
make more situational attributions for such behavior, meaning that a person’s 
environment and other situational social factors play a big role in an individual’s 
life outcome, outside of individual choice and ability (Henry & Reyna, 2007; 
Reyna et al., 2006).  However, research has shown that this “ideo-attribution 
effect” can be reversed based on the consistency between the attribution and 
salient values.  Research has demonstrated that conservatives’ motivations could 
influence whether or not they made situational over dispositional attributions 
(Morgan, Mullen, & Skitka, 2010).  In a recent study, conservatives made more 
situational attributions for Marines accused of killing Iraqi civilians in order to 
maintain consistency between conservative values (e.g. patriotism) and the 
Marines’ wrongdoing.  Therefore, the blame for the Marines’ actions was directed 
at the environment (i.e. a war zone) that the Marines were in rather than the 
dispositional traits of the Marines themselves (Morgan et al., 2010). 
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A natural extension of examining the different motivations for political 
conservatives and liberals involves examining ultimate overarching goals 
motivating each side of the ideological divide.  Liberals tend to be primarily 
interested in supporting public policies that advocate change intended to result in 
greater equality among citizens through economic, political, and social reforms.  
Whereas conservatives tend to support the traditional hierarchical social order and 
resist social change (Jost et al., 2008; Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton, & Linz, 1962). 
Moral Foundations and Political Ideology 
 Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 
2004) was applied to the realm of political ideology in order to see if a more 
complete picture of political partisan differences could be captured via measuring 
the range of moral concerns of conservatives and liberals.  Graham et al. (2009) 
conducted a series of preliminary studies showing distinct differences between 
liberals and conservatives in regards to endorsement of five moral foundations.  
Patterns indicated that liberals, especially those who identify as strongly liberal, 
tended to endorse the Care/Harm and Fairness/Reciprocity foundations over the 
Authority/Respect, Ingroup/Loyalty, and Purity/Sanctity foundations when 
deciding what to take into consideration when determining whether something 
was viewed as right or wrong (Study 1).  Sample items include “Whether or not 
someone was harmed” and “Whether or not someone was denied his or her 
rights” (Graham et al., 2009, p. 1044).  Conservatives (especially those who 
identify as strongly conservative), on the other hand, while still valuing the 
individualizing foundations, also tended to endorse the binding foundations more 
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so than liberals when deciding whether something was wrong or right.  Sample 
items include “Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group” 
and “Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for legitimate authority” 
(Graham et al., 2009, p. 1044).  A similar pattern was discovered when examining 
taboo trade-offs (Graham et al., 2009; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 
2000).  Liberals were more willing (meaning that they accepted a lesser amount of 
money) than conservatives to engage in actions that violated the binding 
foundations (Authority, Ingroup, and Purity).  Some sample scenarios for 
Authority, Ingroup, and Purity violations, respectively, included “Make a 
disrespectful hand gesture to your boss, teacher, or professor,” “Renounce your 
citizenship and become a citizen of another country,” and “Get a blood 
transfusion of 1 pint of disease-free, compatible blood from a convicted child 
molester” (Graham et al., 2009, p. 1045).  Harm and Fairness violations, 
respectively, included “Kick a dog in the head, hard” and “Throw out a box of 
ballots, during an election, to help your favored candidate win” (Graham et al., 
2009, p. 1045).  Overall, the patterns from the data collected through all of these 
studies was able to show consistent differences between liberals and conservatives 
when it comes to endorsing areas of moral concern.  While everyone seems to 
care about Harm and Fairness, conservatives also care about issues relating to the 
binding foundations of Authority, Ingroup, and Purity (Graham et al., 2009, 
Haidt, 2012). 
 Much research has examined the predictions put forth by Moral 
Foundations Theory in concert with other theories surrounding political ideology 
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and the distinctions between liberals and conservatives (Koleva, Graham, Iyer, 
Ditto, & Haidt, 2012; Uhlmann, Pizarro, Tannenbaum, & Ditto, 2009).  In an 
attempt to reconcile political ideology research stating that conservatism results 
from fulfilling a psychological need to manage uncertainty and threat (Jost, 
Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), Van Leeuwen and Park (2009) 
hypothesized that endorsement of the binding moral foundations for conservatives 
provides a way of quelling uncertainty and diminishing threat due to the 
protections that are offered through endorsing such foundations as Authority, 
Ingroup, and Purity.  Their results indicated that perceptions of social dangers, as 
indicated by the belief in a dangerous world (BDW; Altemeyer, 1988), predicted 
political conservatism. However, this relationship was at least partially mediated 
by an endorsement of the binding moral foundations over the individualizing 
foundations (Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009).  Endorsement of the binding 
foundations may help individuals manage threat and uncertainty by endorsing the 
status quo within an established social order and hierarchy, and diminishing 
attempts at social change, all of which are facets of conservatism (Jost et al., 
2003; Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). 
 There appears to be a link between the five major domains of personality 
traits (Costa & McCrae, 1992) and political orientation that is mediated through 
endorsement of different moral foundations (Lewis & Bates, 2011).  Specifically, 
greater openness, neuroticism, and agreeableness significantly predicted 
endorsement of individualizing foundations, which then predicted a more liberal 
political orientation, while greater conscientiousness, neuroticism, and 
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extraversion significantly predicted endorsement of the binding foundations, 
which then predicted a more conservative political orientation (Lewis & Bates, 
2011).  These results further particularized the importance of understanding the 
role that moral values and concerns play in determining political orientation and 
understanding how that is connected to personality characteristics.  This research 
provides insight into understanding that subtle nuances in personality traits may 
play a bigger role in determining both moral endorsements and political 
orientation leanings than previously thought. 
 In further support of the correlation between Moral Foundations Theory 
and political ideology, research has examined the moral stereotypes of liberals 
and conservatives in relation to perceived endorsement of the moral foundations 
(Graham, Nosek, & Haidt, 2012).  In addition to measuring the actual 
endorsements of the moral foundations of their over 2,000 participants, the 
researchers also asked their participants to answer the Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire (MFQ) (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007) as a “typical” 
liberal or “typical” conservative would answer them.  Their results indicated that 
both self-identified liberals and conservatives exaggerated the extremity of typical 
liberals’ and conservatives’ moral concerns.  As noted, this overgeneralization 
was found for both ingroup and outgroup members, even differing with common 
research findings within stereotyping literature which would propose that ingroup 
members would underestimate only the outgroup’s morality (Graham et al., 2012; 
Judd & Park, 1993; McCauley & Stitt, 1978).  Regardless of the role of 
stereotypes, the researchers argue that not only do the moral foundations map on 
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to specific political orientations, but that individuals also perceive that to be the 
case, both for their own political camp and for those outside of their political 
sphere as well (Graham et al., 2012). 
Values 
 One potential explanation for the correlation between endorsement of 
moral foundations and political orientation could be that there is a common 
construct linking the two ideas together: values.  Values are abstract principles 
that serve to guide the way we behave, the way we judge others’ behavior, and 
assist us in explaining our choices, actions, beliefs, and intentions (Schwartz, 
1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; Sverdlik, Roccas, & Sagiv, 2012; Wetherell, 
Brandt, & Reyna, in press).  Values are both similar and different from moral 
principles.  Values are considered to be similar to moral principles in ways such 
as guiding thoughts about what is good or bad, or right and wrong (Cushman, 
Young, & Hauser, 2006).  However, values can consist of much broader personal 
goals that are not always reflected in terms of morality or immorality due to the 
fact that they may not necessarily be considered universally accepted and 
impervious to social consensus and desirability (Bersoff & Miller, 1993; 
Schwartz, 2007; Turiel, 1983).  In this sense, values can encompass moral 
principles, but moral principles cannot encompass all values (Sverdlik et al., 
2012). 
Schwartz (1992) value theory categorizes all ten distinct types of values 
within a framework of two different dimensions: conservation versus openness, 
and self-transcendence versus self-enhancement.  Conservation values (e.g. 
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tradition) emphasize order and resistance to change, whereas openness values 
(e.g. self-direction) emphasize a readiness to experience new things and 
independence.  Values on the side of self-transcendence (e.g. universalism) 
emphasize focusing on others’ welfare while self-enhancement values (e.g. 
hedonism), focus somewhat obviously, on promoting one’s own interests, 
sometimes even at the expense of others’ welfare (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, 
2006; Sverdlik et al., 2012).  In other words, universalism and benevolence values 
emphasize the welfare of others, social justice, and equality, and traditionalism 
emphasizes adherence to social expectations and traditions (Schwartz, 1992; 
Sverdlik et al., 2012).  Values endorsements are heavily influenced by cultural 
and social factors where individuals in more Western cultures tend to emphasize 
benevolence and universalism and individuals in East Asian and African cultures 
emphasize more conformity and tradition values (Sagiv, Schwartz, & Arieli, in 
press).  However, value endorsements can also differ between different cultural 
groups within a country, for example, differences in value endorsements between 
political liberals and conservatives in the United States. 
Values and Political Ideology 
 Politics in the United States is perhaps one of the more obvious examples 
of intercultural differences in value endorsements.  In line with Schwartz (1992) 
values theory, conservatives tend to adhere to conservation and self-enhancing 
values while liberals tend to adhere to self-transcendence and openness values due 
to the different motivations inherent in each aspect of the dimensions of value 
structure as noted earlier.  In terms of specific abstract values, conservatives tend 
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to endorse such values as traditionalism and individualism (e.g. self reliance).  
Liberals, on the other hand, tend to endorse such values as universalism and 
egalitarianism (e.g. equality of outcome) (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Katz & 
Hass, 1988; Wetherell et al., in press). 
Values and Moral Foundations 
 Values endorsements can be connected to endorsements of different moral 
foundations as well.  Such moral foundations as Care/Harm and 
Fairness/Reciprocity are linked to universalism values and the Ingroup/Loyalty 
and Authority/Respect foundations are associated with traditionalism values 
(Sverdilk et al., 2012).  So how can perceptions of morality be so different for 
those within a shared cultural experience? Some research suggests that one’s 
definition of being a moral person depends on which values are prioritized and 
emphasized amongst that particular ingroup.  People who emphasize conservation 
values tend to have a more inclusive view of the moral domain, going beyond 
values related to caring for others and promoting justice (the ethic of autonomy, 
Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997) to include the values related to 
conformity, traditions, and maintaining social order (i.e. the binding foundations).  
However, this group of people share a narrower application of the ethic of 
autonomy (Shweder et al., 1997) meaning that promoting care, preventing harm, 
and encouraging fairness only applies to fellow ingroup members (Schwartz, 
2007; Sverdlik et al., 2012).  On the other hand, people who emphasize openness 
values have a more inclusive view of the ethic of autonomy (Shweder et al., 1997) 
but a narrower definition of the moral domain, which mainly consists of concerns 
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about promoting care, preventing harm, and encouraging fairness and reciprocity 
(i.e. the individualizing foundations) (Sverdlik et al., 2012).  Keeping all of this in 
mind, it is possible to see how the motivational underpinnings of Moral 
Foundations Theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) and its 
association with political ideology might be accounted for through endorsement 
of overarching values, which provide a broader framework for understanding 
motivations for aligning with one side of the political spectrum versus the other. 
Political Ideology and Orientation to Values and Morals 
As important as examining the associations between political ideology and 
different behavioral and attitudinal components is, it is imperative to examine the 
potential causal link between political orientation and its influence on specific 
values and moral proclivities.  Political ideology has been suggested to have a 
structural top-down component to influencing political attitudes and behaviors 
that consists of making salient a unified belief system that can be used, in a 
heuristic fashion, to inform and influence public opinion and perspectives and 
guide behavior (Jost et al., 2003; 2009).  This ideology superstructure is typically 
conveyed in a top down process from political elites to mass public (Jost et al., 
2009; Zaller, 1992).  Because of this direction of information flow from political 
elites, those who have the most control over the contents of the specific 
ideologies, to the less informed and less influential public, one can begin to see 
how adhering to a specific political ideology could result in an automatic 
orientation to previously defined and established values, beliefs, and attitudes 
(Converse, 2000; Jost et al., 2009; Layman & Carsey, 2002).  In other words, 
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mere exposure to and investment in political elite discourse can bring about an 
alignment to and support for the ideas promoted within that discourse (Zaller, 
1992). 
The causal link from political orientation to specific abstract values has 
been examined within the context of survey research conducted through the 
National Election Studies.  Political orientations were shown to be more stable 
than abstract value beliefs and were shown to have a substantial impact on values 
regarding societal functions, family values, and values related to moral tolerance.  
These value endorsements were shown to shift in favor of pre-specified political 
ideological stances over time and coalesce into a uniform orientation reflective of 
the ideological presuppositions of the political orientation (Goren, 2005).  For 
example, those who identified as a conservative came to adopt more conservative 
stances on other relevant policy issues and endorsed more conservative values.  
This research provides evidence for the causal connection from political ideology 
and orientation to endorsement of abstract values and morals, where a person’s 
endorsement of abstract values is a function of the ideology with which they 
identify. 
The research cited has demonstrated that endorsement of abstract values 
and morals could plausibly be a function of an individual’s specified political 
ideology.  And research on political ideology has often focused on the 
psychological and behavioral outcomes of endorsing liberal versus conservative 
ideology. As noted throughout this section, specific political ideology 
endorsement can be linked to different attribution tendencies (Reyna et al., 2006) 
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and specific value endorsements (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Henry & Reyna, 
2007).  However, a question that still remains is whether this causal chain is the 
only possible explanation for the link between ideology, values, and morals.  It 
might be just as likely that the reversal of this causal connection from ideology to 
values and morals is true, where political ideologies are a result of endorsements 
of specific morals and abstract values (as discussed earlier). 
Differentiating and Integrating Political Ideology, Moral Foundations, and Values 
 The relationships between political ideology, moral foundations, and 
abstract values have been discussed in a myriad of combinations and 
permutations.  Part of the utility and purpose of the current research is to assemble 
a coherent and streamlined conceptualization of how these three constructs might 
fit together. 
Starting from the perspective of Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & 
Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004), one can see that moral concerns based on 
concern for the individual versus concern for the group can lead to the 
development of endorsing specific political ideologies that support these moral 
concerns and points of view.  For example, an individual who is prone to make 
judgments about right and wrong based on concerns for individuals within a 
society will be more likely to engage in a liberal political ideology in order to 
engage in a political process that is congruent with his/her moral outlook (Haidt, 
Graham, & Joseph, 2009). 
At the same time, research on political ideology and political orientations 
(Cohen, 2003; Goren, 2005; Jost et al., 2009) has shown that adhering to a 
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specific political ideology can predict endorsement of certain moral principles, 
where an individual is motivated through the commonly held rhetoric of his/her 
political affiliation, which is passed down from elites, to maintain similar and 
consistent belief patterns and moral ideals as is common amongst others within 
that ideological conclave. 
 Integrating these two constructs are endorsements of overarching abstract 
values.  Values can incorporate both endorsement of moral principles and 
endorsement of specific political ideologies because values are a core part of the 
self-concept (Hitlin, 2003; Rokeach, 1973; Verplanken & Holland, 2002).  Values 
can drive one’s inclinations and motivations to join certain social groups (e.g. 
political affiliation) and can influence one’s perceptions of right and wrong (e.g. 
endorsement of moral principles), which are both specific manifestations of self-
relevant abstract values in specific circumstances.  Political ideology incorporates 
one’s values in the realm of thoughts and ideals about society while moral 
principles incorporate one’s values in terms of stances on what is considered right 
or wrong. 
 The current research will experimentally test both of these conceptual 
patterns to see if shifts in one construct, political ideology or endorsement of 
moral foundations, will predict changes in endorsement of moral foundations or 
political ideology, respectively.  In addition, the crucial connecting link between 
political ideology and endorsement of moral principles, regardless of causal 
direction, should be endorsement of abstract values, where overarching abstract 
values are specifically manifested through endorsement of moral principles and 
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also through endorsement of specific political ideologies (Schwartz, 1992; 
Sverdlik et al., 2012).  As a result, endorsement of abstract values should mediate 
any causal link between political ideology and endorsement of moral principles, 
regardless of causal direction.  
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CHAPTER II 
INTRODUCTION AND HYPOTHESES (STUDY 1) 
 The association between Moral Foundations Theory (MFT, Haidt & 
Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) and political ideology has been 
demonstrated in multiple studies through correlational analyses.  Multiple 
moderators and mediators have been suggested for the link between these two 
constructs.  However, the most significantly lacking piece of evidence for the 
connection between MFT and political orientation is experimental replication and 
demonstration.  Despite the multitude of studies demonstrating the connection 
between MFT and political ideology, none of these studies have involved an 
experimental manipulation of moral foundation endorsement or a manipulation of 
political orientation.  This absence of experimental rigor has not gone completely 
unnoticed by other researchers.  According to Graham, Meindl, and Beall (2012): 
…future work on the role of political ideology in morality will need to 
treat ideology not only as a moderator, but as a factor to be experimentally 
manipulated, as well as a dependent variable for manipulations of moral 
salience, behavior, and context. Finding more such interactions and 
pursuing the mechanisms behind them through integrated research can 
help psychologists predict what situational factors will have the greatest 
impact on the moral judgments of different individuals, groups, nations, 
and cultures. (p. 375) 
Van Leeuwen and Park (2009) also suggested a call to arms for future research on 
Moral Foundations Theory by noting, “…researchers might attempt to manipulate 
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the level of emphasis that people place on certain moral foundations and assess 
the impact on political orientation” (p. 173).  In response, the main goal of this 
study will be to experimentally test the link between Moral Foundations Theory 
and political ideology. 
 Since political orientation is typically viewed as an outcome associated 
with endorsement of particular moral foundations, one goal of this research was to 
manipulate endorsement of moral foundations and measure political orientation as 
a dependent variable.  In Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to 
conditions designed to either increase their endorsement of the individualizing 
foundations (Care/Harm and Fairness/Reciprocity) or increase their endorsement 
of the binding foundations (Authority/Respect and Ingroup/Loyalty).  After this 
manipulation, participants were asked to respond to measures of political ideology 
as a dependent variable, which has not typically been done in past research. 
 Looking at the association between Moral Foundations Theory and 
political ideology does not, in and of itself, offer a great deal more insight into the 
causal mechanisms involved in the association.  In order to account for this, the 
present research also attempted to find a causal mechanism for these associations.  
The proposed causal mechanism was endorsement of specific abstract values like 
egalitarianism, traditionalism, universalism, and individualism, which have been 
show to correlate highly with political ideology (Wetherell et al., in press) and 
moral foundation endorsement (Sverdlik et al., 2012).  Participants were asked to 
answer measures of abstract value endorsements.  Endorsement of egalitarianism 
and universalism values should be associated with more liberal political 
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orientation and individualizing moral foundations while endorsement of 
traditionalism and individualism values should be associated with more 
conservative political orientation and binding moral foundations.  Endorsement of 
abstract values should mediate the relationship between moral foundations 
endorsement and political ideology. 
 Within this proposed research framework, there is a possibility for an 
alternative explanation for the link between moral foundations and abstract 
values: cognitive dissonance.  Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957; 
Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Stone & Cooper, 2001) states that if an individual 
simultaneously holds two conflicting self-relevant cognitions, that individual will 
experience discomfort and will seek to change one or both of those cognitions to 
make the cognitions more consonant in order to relieve the discomfort.  In light of 
the current research, if a participant who initially does not endorse the binding 
moral foundations is placed in the endorse binding foundations condition, then 
that individual might be motivated, because of cognitive dissonance, to 
subsequently adjust his/her endorsement of abstract values to be more in line with 
the binding moral foundation.  Cognitive dissonance will occur especially for 
individuals who perceive a high amount of free choice when engaging in the 
counter-attitudinal behavior or cognition because their cognitions are more self-
relevant than someone who felt the had no choice in the matter (Linder, Cooper, 
& Jones, 1967; Stone & Cooper, 2001).  In order to control for this, items 
assessing the participants’ perception of choice and/or free will in completing the 
manipulation task were measured and controlled for during the analyses.  By 
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controlling for perception of choice, a cognitive dissonance explanation will be 
less likely. 
Statement of Hypotheses (Study 1) 
 Hypothesis I.  There will be a main effect of moral foundations 
endorsement condition on political ideology such that participants in the endorse 
individualizing foundations condition will report more liberal political ideology 
than those in the endorse binding foundations condition. 
 Hypothesis II.  There will be a 2 by 2 interaction effect between moral 
foundations endorsement condition and type of abstract value in predicting 
endorsement of abstract values.  Participants in the endorse individualizing 
foundations condition will endorse egalitarianism and universalism (composite) 
values more so than individualism and traditionalism (composite) values. 
However, participants in the endorse binding foundations condition will endorse 
egalitarianism, universalism, individualism, and traditionalism values equally.  
Also, participants in the endorse binding foundations condition will endorse 
individualism and traditionalism values more so than those in the endorse 
individualizing foundations condition. 
 Hypothesis III.  The extent to which participants endorse certain abstract 
values will mediate the relationship between endorsement of moral foundations 
and political ideology.  Specifically, participants in the endorse individualizing 
foundations condition will report more liberal political ideology, but that 
relationship will be at least partially mediated by endorsement of egalitarianism 
and universalism abstract values.  Participants in the endorse binding foundations 
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condition will report more conservative political ideology, but that relationship 
will be at least partially mediated by endorsement of individualism and 
traditionalism abstract values.  
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CHAPTER III 
METHOD (STUDY 1) 
Research Participants 
 Participants for this research were recruited from DePaul University’s 
Psychology Department undergraduate participant pool.  One hundred nine (N = 
109) student participants completed the study online for partial research course 
credit to fulfill a requirement for their introduction to psychology course.  
Demographic measures for each participant were recorded, including age (M = 
20.34, SD = 4.07), gender (63.8% female), religious affiliation (63.8% Christian, 
15.2% Atheist, 3.8% Buddhist, 2.9% Jewish, 1.9% Muslim, 12.4% Other), and 
race/ethnicity (64.8% White, 14.3% Latino/a, 7.6% African American, 1.9% 
Asian, 7.6% Multiracial, 4% Other).  Participants were presented with an 
information page describing the study and what they would be asked to do.  They 
were given the option to exit the study at any time without penalty if they so 
desired. Three participants were eliminated for stating that “being good at math” 
was very relevant or extremely relevant for judging right and wrong.  This item 
has been used in previous research to test the participant’s focus and attention in 
completing the survey (see Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009).  The final sample 
size was N = 106. 
Procedure 
 The study was administered through an online anonymous survey.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions designed to 
increase endorsement of binding foundations (Authority/Respect and 
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Ingroup/Loyalty) or increase endorsement of individualizing foundations 
(Care/Harm and Fairness/Reciprocity).  Once assigned to a condition, participants 
completed the manipulation task for that condition.  Upon completion of the 
manipulation task, participants answered the first 15 items from the Moral 
Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ 30, Graham et al., 2009), measures of abstract 
value endorsement, measures of political ideology, measures of perception of 
choice, and demographic measures.  Upon completion of these measures 
participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation in the study. 
Moral Foundations Endorsement Manipulation 
 Participants in the increase endorsement of binding foundations condition 
(N = 51) were asked to write an essay (1-2 paragraphs) arguing why 1) Betraying 
one’s group is morally wrong, and 2) Disrespecting a legitimate authority is 
morally wrong.  Participants were explicitly told not to report their personal 
opinions about these issues, but to simply argue why these things were wrong.  
Participants in the increase endorsement of individualizing foundations condition 
(N = 55) were asked to write an essay (1-2 paragraphs) arguing why 1) Harming 
an individual is morally wrong, and 2) Cheating someone (e.g. taking something 
away from someone when you don’t deserve it) is morally wrong.  Again, the 
participants were reminded to simply argue these points and not provide any 
personal opinion on either of these matters.  See Appendix A for full manipulation 
materials. 
Manipulation Check 
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 In order to test whether the moral foundation endorsement manipulation 
was successful, participants answered the first 15 items of the Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire (MFQ 30) in order to see which foundations they endorsed over 
others.  Participants answered on a scale of 0 (not at all relevant) to 5 (extremely 
relevant) how relevant specific concerns were to their judgments of right and 
wrong.  Sample items included, “Whether or not someone suffered emotionally,” 
“Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority,” and “Whether 
or not some people were treated differently than others” (MFQ, Graham et al., 
2009).  Participants only responded to the first 15 items in order to avoid any 
possible priming of the moral foundations items for later dependent measures.  
Since the MFQ is only serving as a manipulation check for this study, it was not 
pertinent to use all 30 items (individualizing foundations, 6 items, α = .83, 
binding foundations, 6 items, α = .69).  See Appendix B for full MFQ. 
Abstract Values 
 Endorsement of abstract values was also measured post manipulation.  
Three items were averaged together to measure endorsement of each abstract 
value on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  Sample items for 
each abstract value included: egalitarianism, “I believe that everyone should have 
an equal chance in life” (α = .83); universalism, “I think it is important to be 
tolerant of different ideas and beliefs” (α = .65); individualism, “I think it is 
important to put forth effort to get ahead” (α = .79); and traditionalism, “I believe 
that the traditions of the past should be respected” (α = .84) (adapted from 
Wetherell et al., in press).  See Appendix C for complete measures. 
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Political Ideology 
 Political ideology was measured, after abstract values, using a number of 
different variables.  Participants were asked to answer on a scale of 1 (strongly 
liberal) to 7 (strongly conservative) their social political views and their economic 
political views (i.e. When it comes to social issues, do you usually think of 
yourself as liberal, conservative, or moderate?).  Participants were also asked to 
report their position on specific social and economic policy issues.  They were 
asked their attitudes regarding same-sex marriage, abortion, immigration, and 
warrantless wiretapping with three items each on a scale from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  Sample items included, same-sex marriage: “Gay 
or lesbian couples should have the same legal rights as heterosexual couples” (α = 
.81); abortion: “I support the right to life for unborn children” (α = .83); 
immigration: “Immigrants contribute more to our society than we give them credit 
for” (α = .65); and warrantless wiretapping: “The government should be permitted 
to use warrantless wiretapping in order to get information on suspected terrorists” 
(α = .78).  Higher scores on the same-sex marriage items indicate more positive 
attitudes towards same-sex marriage, which is more prevalent in liberal 
individuals; higher scores on the abortion items indicate more negative attitudes 
towards abortion, which is more prevalent in conservative individuals; higher 
scores on the immigration items indicate more positive attitudes towards abortion, 
which is associated with liberalism; and higher scores on the wiretapping items 
indicate more positive attitudes towards warrantless wiretapping, which is 
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associated with conservatism (Danso, Sedlovskaya, & Suanda, 2007; Gibson & 
Bingham, 1982; Poteat & Mereish, 2012). 
Attitudes regarding economic issues were also assessed, including 
attitudes regarding government assistance and free enterprise.  Sample items 
included, government assistance: “The government should set up programs to 
help the poor” (α = .64) (adapted from Weber & Federico, 2013); free enterprise: 
“The less government gets involved with business and the economy, the better off 
this country will be” (α = .79) (adapted from Feldman, 1988).  Higher scores on 
the government assistance items indicate more positive attitudes towards 
government assistance, which is associated with more liberal disposition, and 
higher scores on the free enterprise items indicate more positive attitudes towards 
free enterprise, which is associated with a more conservative disposition.  See 
Appendix D for complete measures. 
Control Variables 
 Perception of choice and/or free will in completing the manipulation task 
was assessed with three items with response scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(very much).  Items included, “How freely could you express yourself when 
writing your essays?”; “To what extent do you feel that you had any control when 
writing your essays?”; and “How much did you identify with what you wrote 
about in your essays?”  Higher scores on these items indicate higher perception of 
choice or free will in completing the manipulation task. 
 In addition to these control variables, two items assessed agreement with 
and difficulty in coming up with the logical arguments in the manipulation task.  
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In order to measure agreement, participants were asked to report on a scale from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), “To what extent do you agree with what 
you wrote about in your essays?”  To measure how difficult it was for participants 
to come up with the logical arguments, they were asked to report on a scale from 
1 (very difficult) to 7 (very easy), “How easy was it for you to come up with your 
arguments in your essays?” (scale for all five items: α = .85).  These responses 
were also used as control variables during the main analyses discussed in the next 
section. Demographic variables such as gender, ethnicity, age, religion, and 
political party identification were measured at the end of the survey.  See 
Appendix E for complete measures. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS (STUDY 1) 
 For Study 1, it was expected that participants in the endorse 
individualizing foundations condition would report more liberal tendencies for the 
political ideology measures.  At the same time, those in the endorse binding 
foundations condition would report more conservative tendencies for the political 
ideology measures.  However, these relationships would be at least partially 
mediated via endorsement of abstract values.  Specifically, participants in the 
endorse individualizing foundations condition would report a greater endorsement 
of universalism and egalitarianism values compared to individualism and 
traditionalism values, which would also predict more liberal political ideology.  
Participants in the endorse binding foundations condition would report a greater 
endorsement of individualism and traditionalism values than would those in the 
endorse individualizing foundations condition, which would predict more 
conservative political ideology. 
Manipulation Check 
 In order to check if the moral foundations endorsement manipulations 
were successful, a 2 by 2 mixed model ANCOVA (Analysis of Covariance) was 
computed with manipulation condition as the independent variable and type of 
moral foundation endorsement as the within subjects variable predicting 
endorsement of moral foundations.  The average of both the Care/Harm and 
Fairness/Reciprocity MFQ scores was computed (individualizing foundations) 
and served as one level of the within subjects variable.  The average of the 
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Authority/Respect and Ingroup/Loyalty MFQ scores was computed (binding 
foundations) and served as the other level of the within subjects variable.  As a 
reminder, perception of choice1 was included as a covariate for all further 
analyses.  There was no significant interaction effect between condition and type 
of foundation predicting endorsement of moral foundations, F(1, 103) < 1.  
Participants in the endorse individualizing foundations condition significantly 
endorsed the individualizing foundations (M = 4.84, SE = .09) more so than the 
binding foundations (M = 3.85, SE = .10), F(1, 53) = 6.03, p < .05, ηp2 = .10.  
However, participants in the endorse binding foundations condition also 
significantly endorsed the individualizing foundations (M = 4.89, SE = .11) more 
than the binding foundations (M = 3.99, SE = .11), F(1, 49) = 20.94, p < .001, ηp2 
= .30.  In addition, participants in the endorse binding foundations condition (M = 
4.03, SE = .11) did not significantly endorse the binding foundations more than 
those in the endorse individualizing foundations condition (M = 3.81, SE = .10), 
F(1, 103) = 2.16, ns.  Since the overall 2 by 2 mixed model ANOVA interaction 
was not significant the moral foundations endorsement manipulation cannot be 
considered successful. 
Analyses for Specific Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis I. The first hypothesis stated that there would be a main effect 
of moral foundation endorsement condition on political ideology such that 
participants in the endorse individualizing foundations condition would report 
more liberal political ideology than those in the endorse binding foundations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Composite score of all 5 perception of choice items. 
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condition.  One-way ANCOVAs controlling for perception of choice were 
computed with manipulation condition (individualizing, binding) as the 
independent variable and the social, economic, and general political ideology 
measures as separate dependent variables.  For further detailed analysis, one-way 
ANCOVAs were also computed with manipulation condition as the independent 
variable and attitudes towards same-sex marriage, abortion, immigration, 
warrantless wiretapping, government assistance, and free enterprise as separate 
dependent variables (see Table 1).  Since none of the comparisons between the 
two conditions on any of the dependent variables were significant (except for 
General Party ID, which was significant in the wrong direction), Hypothesis I was 
not supported. 
Hypothesis II.  The second hypothesis stated that there would be a 2 by 2 
interaction effect between moral foundations endorsement condition and type of 
abstract value on endorsement of abstract values such that participants in the 
endorse individualizing foundations condition would endorse egalitarianism and 
universalism values more so than individualism and traditionalism values. At the 
same time, participants in the endorse binding foundations condition would 
endorse egalitarianism, universalism, individualism, and traditionalism values 
equally.  The interaction between moral foundations endorsement condition and 
type of abstract value on endorsement of abstract values while controlling for 
perception of choice was not significant, F(1, 103) < 1.  Participants in the 
endorse individualizing foundations condition did not significantly endorse 
egalitarianism and universalism (composite score) values (M = 5.87, SE = .11) 
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more than individualism and traditionalism (composite score) values (M = 5.11, 
SE = .10), F(1, 53) = 1.94, ns.  However, participants in the endorse binding 
foundations condition significantly endorsed egalitarianism/universalism values 
(M = 5.94, SE = .15) more than individualism/traditionalism values (M = 5.17, SE 
= .14), F(1, 49) = 6.42, p < .05, ηp2 = .12.  In addition, participants in the endorse 
binding foundations condition (M = 5.20, SE = .12) did not endorse 
individualism/traditionalism values more so than those in the endorse 
individualizing foundations condition (M = 5.08, SE = .12), F(1, 103) < 1.  Since 
the 2 by 2 mixed model ANOVA interaction was not significant, Hypothesis II 
was not supported. 
 Hypothesis III.  The third hypothesis stated that the extent to which 
participants endorse certain abstract values would mediate the relationship 
between endorsement of moral foundations and political ideology.  Specifically, 
participants in the endorse individualizing foundations condition would report 
more liberal political ideology, but that relationship would be at least partially 
mediated by endorsement of egalitarianism and universalism abstract values.  
Participants in the endorse binding foundations condition would report more 
conservative political ideology, but that relationship would be at least partially 
mediated by endorsement of individualism and traditionalism abstract values.  In 
addition to the mediation, it was predicted that perception of choice would 
moderate the relationship between the manipulation condition and endorsement of 
abstract values. 
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In order to test this, moderated mediation path analysis in SPSS using the 
Process macro with 5000 bootstrap samples was used (Hayes, 2013; Preacher & 
Hayes, 2008)2.  The model consists of manipulation condition predicting political 
ideology and endorsement of abstract values.  Abstract values also predicts 
political ideology and the model also tests for a significant indirect effects of 
manipulation condition on political ideology through endorsement of each 
abstract value based on levels of perception of choice as a moderator.  The full 
moderated mediation model was not significant and perception of choice failed to 
moderate the relationship between manipulation condition and any endorsement 
of abstract values.  Because of all of these factors only a simple mediation model 
is presented (see Figure 1).  The moral foundation manipulation did not 
significantly predict any of the abstract values, nor did it predict political 
ideology. In addition, none of the indirect effects of manipulation condition on 
ideology through any of the abstract values were significant (see Table 2). 
Therefore, Hypothesis III was not supported. 
Additional Analyses 
 Due to the fact that the moral foundation endorsement manipulation was 
not successful, one cannot confidently make any claims about how moral 
foundation endorsement does or does not predict political ideology.  However, it 
is possible to get a little closer to answering this question by looking at the 
correlations between the moral foundations questionnaire items that were used as 
a manipulation check and the political ideology measures.  By examining these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Standardizing the scales makes no difference during analyses, so items are left in 
original scale units (see Hayes, 2013). 
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correlations, one can see if moral foundation endorsement has any bearing or 
connection to where people stand ideologically. 
 Correlations between moral foundations and political ideology measures.  
The individualizing foundation composite score was significantly negatively 
correlated with general political party identification (r = -.25, p < .01), attitudes 
regarding same-sex marriage (r = -.27, p < .01), attitudes regarding government 
assistance (r = -.45, p < .001), and attitudes regarding free enterprise (r = -.20, p < 
.05).  The more participants endorsed the individualizing foundations, the more 
liberal they tended to lean in regards to a few political attitudes.  The binding 
foundation composite score was significantly positively correlated with attitudes 
regarding abortion (r = .33, p < .01) and attitudes regarding warrantless 
wiretapping (r = .26, p < .01) only.  The more participants endorsed the binding 
foundations, the conservative they tended to lean, but only in respect to their 
attitudes on abortion and warrantless wiretapping.  So these correlations do, at 
least to a small degree, support some of the claims of Moral Foundations Theory, 
where placing the individual at the center of moral value is associated with a more 
liberal political stance and placing the group at the center of moral value is 
association with a conservative stance.  Of course, causality cannot be implied 
through correlational analysis, and further work would need to be done to flesh 
out these associations more clearly. 
Analyses of hypotheses dropping those not affected by manipulation.  In 
order to take a closer look at the role that perception of choice and self-relevance 
played in determining the efficacy of the moral foundations endorsement 
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manipulation, the manipulation check analysis was computed while eliminating 
participants who stated that they disagreed with what they wrote about in their 
essays (N = 15).  By removing these participants, I increase the chances that the 
participants who are left are the most personally invested in what they wrote and 
will be more likely to agree with what they wrote about in their essays.   
The 2 by 2 interaction effect between manipulation condition and type of 
moral foundation in predicting moral foundation endorsement was significant 
with the pattern in the predicted direction, F(1, 88) = 4.00, p < .05, ηp2 = .04.  
Participants in the endorse individualizing foundations condition significantly 
endorsed the individualizing foundations (M = 4.87, SE = .08) more so than the 
binding foundations (M = 3.87, SE = .10), F(1, 51) = 6.56, p < .05, ηp2 = .11.  
Also, participants in the endorse binding foundations condition endorsed the 
individualizing foundations (M = 4.89, SE = .11) the same as the binding 
foundations (M = 4.19, SE = .11), F(1, 36) = 1.46, ns.  In addition, participants in 
the endorse binding foundations condition (M = 4.13, SE = .11) significantly 
endorsed the binding foundations more than those in the endorse individualizing 
foundations condition (M = 3.86, SE = .10), F(1, 88) = 4.59, p < .05, ηp2 = .05. 
 These results, without the participants who did not respond to the 
manipulation, show that the manipulation worked just as hypothesized.  
Participants who agreed with what they wrote could be manipulated into 
endorsing either individualizing or binding moral foundations.  These results 
point to the power of perception of choice and of invoking the self in one’s 
argument and how that might cause an individual to more easily believe in and 
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adopt what they are arguing.  And while selecting out these participants allowed 
the manipulation to be successful, there were no other differences in any of the 
analyses for the other hypotheses.  These data could potential speak to the ability, 
or lack thereof, of moral foundations to accurately predict one’s political 
ideology, as Moral Foundations Theory currently suggests (Graham, Haidt, & 
Nosek, 2009).  Of course there are concerns with removing so many participants 
from the sample.  Obviously there is something about morality that makes it 
difficult to get individuals to argue against their predispositions.  These ideas will 
be further discussed in the next section.  
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION (STUDY 1) 
 The goal of Study 1 was to experimentally examine the relationship 
between the pattern of endorsement of moral foundations and one’s political 
ideology.  Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 
2004) suggests that people who base judgments of right and wrong on 
principles/foundations related to promoting care, preventing harm, and promoting 
fairness and equality (individualizing foundations) tend to lean more liberal, 
politically.  At the same time, those who base judgments of right and wrong on 
principles/foundations related to respecting authority and maintaining loyalty to 
one’s ingroup (binding foundations) tend to endorse a more conservative political 
ideology.  By attempting to experimentally manipulate which set of moral 
foundations one endorses, I predicted that participants who were manipulated to 
endorse the individualizing foundations would respond to political ideology 
measures with a more liberal stance compared to those who were manipulated to 
endorse the binding foundations and respond more conservatively to the political 
ideology measures.  Along with these predictions, I hypothesized that 
endorsement of abstract values would mediate this association such that those in 
the individualizing condition would endorse egalitarianism and universalism 
values, which would then lead to a more liberal ideology.  And those in the 
binding condition would endorse individualism and traditionalism values, which 
would then lead to a more conservative ideology. 
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 In addition to these predictions, I hypothesized that the manipulation 
would only be successful for participants who felt they had a choice when writing 
their essays.  By controlling for the perception of choice, the current research is 
better able to examine how the internalization of what the participants were 
writing about had an effect on their abstract value endorsement and political 
ideology.  Participants who did not perceive any choice when writing their essay 
would be more likely to dismiss what they wrote as something they just “had to 
do” instead of something they actually believed and were convinced of (Stone & 
Cooper, 2001). 
Findings and Implications 
 While participants in the endorse individualizing foundations condition 
did significantly endorse the individualizing foundations more so than the binding 
foundations after the manipulation, those in the endorse binding foundations 
condition also endorsed the individualizing foundations more so than the binding 
foundations.  In addition, participants in the endorse binding foundations 
condition did not differ from those in the other condition on their binding 
foundations scores.  Taken together, these results suggest that the moral 
foundation manipulation for Study 1 was not successful.  Writing about why 
disrespecting an authority figure and betraying loyalty to one’s ingroup did not 
make participants endorse the binding foundations any more than those in the 
other condition. 
 One potential explanation for the moral foundation manipulation failure is 
that those in the endorse binding foundations condition were actually providing 
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more individual-focused explanations for why disrespecting authority and 
betraying one’s ingroup is wrong.  Due to time constraints for conducting and 
analyzing the current research, the actual content of the written essays were not 
coded for presence of binding versus individualizing foundation content.  
Therefore, it could be the case that participants in the binding foundation 
condition were able to spin their responses in order to line up with their more 
liberal disposition that they most likely started with (due to DePaul University 
having a mostly liberal student sample).  If this is the case, then the manipulation 
task for the binding foundations condition would have had the opposite effect as 
intended, which could explain the lack of difference between conditions for most 
of the dependent measures.  Future research should involve content coding the 
written responses to see if more individualized content than binding content is 
found in the essays written by those in the endorse binding foundation condition.  
If more individualized content is found then one can be sure that a change in the 
manipulation prompt and/or instructions would need to occur. 
One way to improve the manipulation materials would be to adjust the 
prompt slightly and ask participants to argue why they think a specific moral 
statement is morally wrong.  This change could make the manipulation more 
sensitive by including the participant in the argument itself. By asking the 
participant why they think a specific moral stance is wrong, the manipulation 
would automatically incorporate more of the self for each participant, allowing for 
each person to take more ownership of the arguments they provide in their essays.  
The manipulation prompt currently encourages participants to not express their 
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personal opinion in their writing.  This wording could have given the participants 
license to divorce their actual opinions, thoughts, and feelings from what they 
wrote.  Instead, one could ask the participant to think about a time when 
something related to the prompt happened to them, a family member or friend, or 
to their community.  Instructing the participants to fuel their arguments from real 
life experiences would make them really engaged and invested in what they are 
writing, which would allow more possibility for actually adopting that viewpoint 
as part of the self. 
 An interesting point regarding the association between moral foundations, 
political ideology, and abstract values that was somewhat revealed through these 
data is that abstract values were not significant explanatory mediators for the 
association between moral foundation endorsement and political ideology.  While 
egalitarianism and traditionalism value endorsement did significantly predict 
political ideology in the expected directions, none of the abstract values were 
endorsed as a result of the manipulation condition.  This lack of association 
between the manipulation and value endorsement could be because the endorse 
individualizing condition prompt did not ask participants to consider specifically 
egalitarian concepts or examples. One could easily write about how harming an 
individual is wrong without invoking egalitarian values for their argument. 
In addition, values researchers (e.g Schwartz, 1992) might argue that 
everyone endorses all values just to differing degrees. So it may be the case that 
one’s level of absolute endorsement of an abstract value does not change as a 
result of a change in endorsement of moral principles, but instead one might just 
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change the order of prioritization for the values.  Instead of expecting to see 
differences in how much one endorses traditionalism in and of itself, it might be 
more advantageous to look at how one endorses traditionalism in relation to other 
values, like egalitarianism or universalism.  We might find that participants who 
are manipulated to endorse more binding foundations end up prioritizing 
traditionalism or individualism over other values without necessarily changing 
how much they endorse these values.  Having participants rank order multiple 
values and provide their level of endorsement of each one could provide a way of 
getting a more nuanced look at value prioritization instead of just value 
endorsement on its own. 
 Of course, it is also possible that the moral foundation manipulation, even 
if it had been entirely successful, was not enough to change people’s endorsement 
of moral principles.  Indeed, some morality research has shown that people seem 
to hold onto their moralized attitudes and opinions even in the face of 
counterargument or opposition (Skitka, 2010).  With this in mind, it may be the 
case that it is close to impossible to manipulate one’s moral outlook, especially in 
such a short experimental study such as the current research.  One most likely 
needs to be extremely motivated to change their moral orientation, and it is 
possible that the manipulation prompts were too impersonal and generic to 
warrant any personal investment by the participants. 
 Without a doubt, the most looming limitation of this study was the fact 
that the moral foundations endorsement manipulation was unsuccessful.  
However, manipulations failing are always a risk for experimental studies.  This is 
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part of the price we pay when trying to implement experimental control into 
research.  Inferences about causality become a little clearer and, more 
importantly, alternative explanations are more easily ruled out with experiments.  
It would have been possible to examine the relationship between moral 
foundation endorsement and political ideology organically, but that would have 
eliminated any chance for speculation on causality and would have also been 
susceptible to alternative explanations. 
Due to the manipulation being unable to make participants endorse the 
desired moral foundations, it becomes quite difficult to make clear-cut 
conclusions regarding the implications of the results of the other analyses.  As 
predicted by Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 
2004), most of the participants trended toward endorsing the individualizing 
foundations over the binding foundations, regardless of condition.  However, the 
binding foundation endorsement manipulation made no difference on the binding 
foundations scores.  Also, the additional correlational analyses suggest that, at 
least to some degree, individualizing foundation endorsement is associated with 
liberal ideology and binding foundation endorsement is associated with 
conservative ideology. 
These data, although very weak, may provide indirect support for the link 
between individualizing foundation endorsement and liberal political ideology 
leaning.  Since the manipulation failed, most participants endorsed the 
individualizing foundations and ended up leaning to the political left on almost all 
issues and measures of ideology.  Of course causality cannot be inferred here and 
 51	  
further experimental work would need to be done in order to test this more 
clearly.  But, for the scope of this study, a case could potentially be made that the 
link between moral foundations and political ideology as described in the moral 
foundations literature (e.g. Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) may 
still be valid, or at least not invalidated because of the results of this study. 
Conclusion 
 In trying to better understand the association between moral foundation 
endorsement and political ideology, the results of Study 1 are inconclusive at best.  
Manipulating one’s moral foundation endorsement had no effect on their political 
ideology or their endorsement of specific abstract values within the context of this 
study.  The current research shows that it is difficult to manipulate people’s locus 
of moral concern, which in turn makes it difficult to predict how those concerns 
will relate to political ideology.  While the current study was unsuccessful at 
manipulating moral foundation endorsement, it does shed some light on areas for 
future research to further address the methodological shortcomings of this study.  
By taking into account the presented suggestions for future research, it may be 
possible to more clearly identify the causal role that moral concerns may have on 
one’s political ideology. 
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CHAPTER VI 
INTRODUCTION AND HYPOTHESES (STUDY 2) 
Another goal of this research was to examine the direction of causality 
between endorsement of moral foundations and political ideology.  While it has 
been assumed that political preference stems from endorsement of specific moral 
foundations as purported by Moral Foundations Theory (Graham et al., 2009; 
Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004), this research also examined if the 
reverse association could be true, where endorsement of moral foundations results 
from adherence to specific political ideology.  In Study 2, participants were 
randomly assigned to different conditions designed to either increase 
conservatism or decrease conservatism by making a logical argument promoting 
conservatism or by making a logical argument promoting liberalism.  Based on 
previous research, this paradigm has been shown to be effective in producing 
ideological shifts along a single-item liberal to conservative measure where the 
increase conservatism condition tended to make participants respond more 
conservatively and the decrease conservatism condition tended to make 
participants respond more liberally (Solomon & Brown, 2012).  After the 
manipulation, participants answered political ideology measures, abstract values 
measures, and the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ, Graham et al., 2009) 
to see if endorsement of moral foundations differed by condition.  Also, as with 
Study 1, perception of choice in completing the manipulation task was measured 
in order to account for any cognitive dissonance alternative explanation.  By 
looking at the association between Moral Foundations Theory and political 
 53	  
ideology in both directions, this research will be able to examine in greater detail 
the nuances between the two constructs. 
Statement of Hypotheses (Study 2) 
Hypothesis I.  There will be a 2 by 2 interaction effect between political 
ideology condition and type of moral foundation in predicting endorsement of 
moral foundations.  Participants in the decrease conservative condition will 
endorse the individualizing foundations more so than the binding foundations. 
However, participants in the increase conservatism condition will endorse 
individualizing and binding foundations equally.  Also, participants in the 
increase conservatism condition will endorse the binding foundations more so 
than those in the decrease conservatism condition. 
Hypothesis II.  There will be a 2 by 2 interaction effect between political 
ideology condition and type of abstract value in predicting endorsement of 
abstract values.  Participants in the decrease conservatism condition will endorse 
egalitarianism and universalism values more so than individualism and 
traditionalism values.  However, participants in the increase conservatism 
condition endorse egalitarianism, universalism, individualism, and traditionalism 
values equally.  Also, participants in the increase conservatism condition will 
endorse individualism and traditionalism values more so than those in the 
decrease conservatism condition. 
 Hypothesis III.  The extent to which participants endorse certain abstract 
values will mediate the relationship between political ideology and endorsement 
of moral foundations.  Specifically, participants in the decrease conservatism 
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condition will report greater endorsement of the individualizing foundations, but 
that relationship will be at least partially mediated by endorsement of 
egalitarianism and universalism abstract values.  Participants in the increase 
conservatism condition will report greater endorsement of the binding 
foundations, but that relationship will be at least partially mediated by 
endorsement of individualism and traditionalism abstract values.  
 55	  
CHAPTER VII 
METHOD (STUDY 2) 
Research Participants 
 As in study 1, participants for this research were recruited from DePaul 
University’s Psychology Department undergraduate participant pool.  Eighty-nine 
(N = 89) student participants completed the study online for partial research 
course credit to fulfill a requirement for their introduction to psychology course.  
Demographic measures for each participant were recorded, including age (M = 
19.99, SD = 4.13), gender (75.3% female), religious affiliation (69.9% Christian, 
8.4% Atheist, 2.4% Buddhist, 1.2% Muslim, 1.2% Hindu, 16.9% Other), and 
race/ethnicity (56.5% White, 21.2% Latino/a, 9.4% African American, 4.7% 
Asian, 2.4% Multiracial, 6% Other).  Participants were presented with an 
information page describing the study and what they would be asked to do.  They 
were given the option to exit the study at any time without penalty if they so 
desired. Four participants were eliminated for stating that “being good at math” 
was very or extremely relevant for judging right and wrong (see Graham, Haidt, 
& Nosek, 2009), leaving a final sample size of N = 85. 
Procedure 
 The study was administered through an online anonymous survey.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions designed to 
increase conservatism or decrease conservatism.  Once assigned to a condition, 
participants completed the manipulation task for that condition and answered 
measures of political ideology, measures of abstract value endorsement, the Moral 
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Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ, Graham et al., 2009), measures of perception 
of choice, and demographic measures.  Upon completion of these measures 
participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation in the study. 
Political Ideology Manipulation 
 Participants in the increase conservatism condition (N = 46) were asked to 
write an essay (1-2 paragraphs) about how these particular viewpoints are correct 
or true: 1) Everyone is responsible for their own standing in life, 2) Inequality that 
exists in the world is there for a reason, and 3) Change in society is usually a bad 
thing (Solomon & Brown, 2012).  Participants were explicitly told not to report 
their personal opinions about these issues, but to simply think of a logical 
argument for why these points of view could be correct or true.  Participants in 
the decrease conservatism condition (N = 39) were asked to write an essay (1-2 
paragraphs) about how the same viewpoints are incorrect or untrue.  Again, the 
participants were reminded to simply think of a logical argument for why these 
points of view could be incorrect or untrue.  See Appendix F for complete 
manipulation materials. 
Manipulation Check 
 To test if the political ideology manipulation was successful, participants 
answered multiple political ideology measures, post manipulation.  Participants 
were asked to answer on a scale of 1 (strongly liberal) to 7 (strongly conservative) 
their social political views and their economic political views (see Study 1).  
Participants were also asked to report their position on specific social and 
economic policy issues.  They were asked their attitudes regarding same-sex 
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marriage (α = .76), abortion (α = .75), immigration (α = .69), and warrantless 
wiretapping (α = .71) with three items each on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 7 (strongly agree) (see Study 1).  Higher scores on the same-sex marriage items 
indicate more positive attitudes towards same-sex marriage, which is more 
prevalent in liberal individuals; higher scores on the abortion items indicate more 
negative attitudes towards abortion, which is more prevalent in conservative 
individuals; higher scores on the immigration items indicate more positive 
attitudes towards abortion, which is associated with liberalism; and higher scores 
on the wiretapping items indicate more positive attitudes towards warrantless 
wiretapping, which is associated with conservatism (Danso, Sedlovskaya, & 
Suanda, 2007; Gibson & Bingham, 1982; Poteat & Mereish, 2012). 
Attitudes regarding economic issues were also assessed, including 
attitudes regarding government assistance (α = .75) and free enterprise (α = .62) 
(see Study 1).  Higher scores on the government assistance items indicate more 
positive attitudes towards government assistance, which is associated with more 
liberal disposition, and higher scores on the free enterprise items indicate more 
positive attitudes towards free enterprise, which is associated with a more 
conservative disposition.  Again, see Appendix D for complete measures. 
Abstract Values 
 Endorsement of abstract values was also measured after the political 
ideology measures.  Three items were averaged together to measure endorsement 
of each abstract value (egalitarianism, α = .83; universalism, α = .65; 
individualism, α = .82; and traditionalism, α = .75) on a scale of 1 (strongly 
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disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (see Study 1).  Again, see Appendix C for complete 
measures. 
Moral Foundations Endorsement 
 Participants answered the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ 30) in 
order to see which foundations they endorsed over others.  Participants answered 
on a scale of 0 (not at all relevant) to 5 (extremely relevant) how relevant specific 
concerns were to their judgments of right and wrong (individualizing foundations, 
α = .83; binding foundations, α = .71) (MFQ; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & 
Joseph, 2004).  Again, see Appendix B for full MFQ. 
Control Variables 
 Perception of choice in completing the manipulation task was assessed 
with three items with response scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) 
(see Study 1).  Higher scores on these items indicate higher perception of choice 
or free will in completing the manipulation task. 
 In addition to these control variables, two items assessed agreement with 
and difficulty in coming up with the logical arguments in the manipulation task 
(see Study 1).  These responses were also used as control variables during the 
main analyses discussed in the next section (scale for all five items, α = .89). 
Demographic variables such as gender, ethnicity, age, religion, and political party 
identification were measured at the end of the survey.  Again, see Appendix E for 
complete measures 
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CHAPTER VIII 
RESULTS (STUDY 2) 
 For Study 2, it was expected that participants in the increase conservatism 
condition would report a greater endorsement of the binding moral foundations 
compared to the decrease conservatism condition.  At the same time, those in the 
decrease conservatism condition would report a greater endorsement of the 
individualizing moral foundations over the binding moral foundations.  However, 
these relationships would be at least partially mediated via endorsement of 
abstract values.  Specifically, participants in the decrease conservatism condition 
would report a greater endorsement of universalism and egalitarianism values, 
which would also predict endorsement of individualizing foundations.  
Participants in the increase conservatism condition would report a greater 
endorsement of individualism and traditionalism values, which would predict 
endorsement of binding foundations. 
Manipulation Check 
 In order to check if the political ideology manipulations were successful, 
one-way ANCOVAs controlling for perception of choice3 were computed with 
manipulation condition (increase conservatism, decrease conservatism) as the 
independent variable and the social, economic, and general political ideology 
measures as separate dependent variables.  For further detailed analysis, one-way 
ANCOVAs were computed with manipulation condition as the independent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 One item asking participants how freely they could express themselves while 
writing their essays was used as the control for all analyses since it was the only 
choice item that did not systematically differ between experimental conditions 
(see Field, 2009). 
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variable and attitudes towards same-sex marriage, abortion, immigration, 
warrantless wiretapping, government assistance, and free enterprise as separate 
dependent variables.  In order for the manipulation check to be considered 
successful, participants in the increase conservatism condition would need to 
report significantly more conservative scores than those in the decrease 
conservatism condition on some (or all) dependent ideology measures.  The two 
experimental conditions were different on a few of the ideology measures. 
Participants in the increase conservatism condition (M = 3.22, SE = .20) were 
marginally significantly more Republican than those in the decrease conservatism 
condition (M = 2.72, SE = .21), F(1, 81) = 2.83, p < .10, ηp2 = .03.  Participants in 
the increase conservatism condition (M = 3.06, SE = .19) were also marginally 
significantly more socially conservative than those in the decrease conservatism 
condition (M = 2.55, SE = .21), F(1, 82) = 3.25, p < .10, ηp2 = .04 (see Table 3).  
Due to these findings, the manipulation for political ideology can be considered at 
least partially successful. 
Analyses for Specific Hypotheses 
Hypothesis I.  The first hypothesis stated that there would be a 2 by 2 
interaction effect between political ideology condition and type of moral 
foundation in predicting endorsement of moral foundations such that participants 
in the decrease conservatism condition would endorse the individualizing 
foundations more so than the binding foundations.  At the same time, participants 
in the increase conservatism condition would endorse the individualizing and 
binding foundations equally.  The average of both the Care/Harm and 
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Fairness/Reciprocity MFQ scores were computed (individualizing foundations) 
and served as one level of the within subjects variable.  The Authority/Respect 
and Ingroup/Loyalty MFQ scores were computed (binding foundations) and 
served as the other level of the within subjects variable.  A 2 by 2 mixed model 
ANCOVA revealed that an interaction between political ideology condition and 
type of moral foundation predicting endorsement of moral foundations while 
controlling for perception of choice was significant, F(1, 82) = 4.17, p < .05, ηp2 = 
.05.  Participants in the decrease conservatism condition significantly endorsed 
the individualizing foundations (M = 4.74, SE = .13) more so than the binding 
foundations (M = 3.76, SE = .10), F(1, 37) = 5.67, p < .05, ηp2 = .13.  However, 
participants in the increase conservatism condition also significantly endorsed the 
individualizing foundations (M = 4.58, SE = .09) more so than the binding 
foundations (M = 3.95, SE = .09), F(1, 44) = 12.35, p < .01, ηp2 = .22.  In addition, 
participants in the increase conservatism condition (M = 3.97, SE = .09) endorsed 
the binding foundations more so than those in the decrease conservatism 
condition (M = 3.73, SE = .10), F(1, 82) = 3.08, p < .10, ηp2 = .04 (see Figure 2).  
Since the overall mixed model ANCOVA interaction was significant, and the 
pattern was mostly consistent with the predication, Hypothesis I was largely 
supported. 
 Hypothesis II.  The second hypothesis stated that there would be a 2 by 2 
interaction effect between political ideology condition and type of abstract value 
on endorsement of abstract values such that participants in the decrease 
conservatism condition would endorse egalitarianism and universalism values 
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more so than individualism and traditionalism values. At the same time, 
participants in the increase conservatism condition would endorse egalitarianism, 
universalism, individualism, and traditionalism values equally.  The interaction 
between political ideology condition and type of abstract value on endorsement of 
abstract values while controlling for perception of choice was not significant, F(1, 
82) = 2.25, ns.  Participants in the decrease conservatism condition marginally 
significantly endorsed egalitarianism and universalism (composite score) values 
(M = 6.06, SE = .14) more so than individualism and traditionalism (composite 
score) values (M = 5.39, SE = .12), F(1, 37) = 2.90, p < .10, ηp2 = .07.  However, 
participants in the increase conservatism conditions also marginally significantly 
endorsed egalitarianism/universalism values (M = 5.86, SE = .13) more so than 
individualism/traditionalism values (M = 5.45, SE = .12), F(1, 44) = 3.11, p < .10, 
ηp2 = .07.  In addition, participants in the increase conservatism condition (M = 
5.46, SE = .12) did not endorse individualism/traditionalism values more so than 
those in the decrease conservatism condition (M = 5.39, SE = .13), F(1, 82) < 1.  
Hypothesis II was not entirely supported. 
 Hypothesis III.  The third hypothesis stated that the extent to which 
participants endorse certain abstract values would mediate the relationship 
between political ideology and endorsement of moral foundations.  Specifically, 
participants in the decrease conservatism condition would report a greater 
endorsement of the individualizing foundations, but that relationship would be at 
least partially mediated by endorsement of egalitarianism and universalism 
abstract values.  Participants in the increase conservatism condition would report 
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a greater endorsement of the binding foundations, but that relationship would be 
at least partially mediated by endorsement of individualism and traditionalism 
abstract values.  In addition to the mediation, it was predicted that perception of 
choice would moderate the relationship between the manipulation condition and 
endorsement of abstract values. 
In order to test this, moderated mediation path analysis in SPSS using 
Process macro with 5000 bootstrap samples was used (Hayes, 2013; Preacher & 
Hayes, 2008).  The model consists of manipulation condition predicting moral 
foundation endorsement and endorsement of abstract values.  Abstract values also 
predicts moral foundation endorsement and the model also tests for significant 
indirect effects of manipulation condition on moral foundation endorsement 
through endorsement of each abstract value based on levels of perception of 
choice as a moderator. 
The indirect effect of condition on individualizing foundation endorsement 
through traditionalism was non-significant despite the significant interaction 
between condition and perception of choice (see Table 4 and Figure 3). Also, 
there was a significant indirect effect of condition on individualizing foundations 
through egalitarianism such that participants in the decrease conservatism 
condition endorsed egalitarianism values and then in turn endorsed more 
individualizing moral foundations (see Table 4 and Figure 3). 
The indirect effect of condition on binding foundation endorsement 
through traditionalism was significant for those with high choice perception such 
that participants in the increase conservatism condition who felt they had a lot of 
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choice in writing their essays endorsed traditionalism values and then in turn 
endorsed more binding moral foundations (see Table 5 and Figure 4). Also, there 
was a significant indirect effect of condition on binding foundation endorsement 
through egalitarianism such that participants in the decrease conservatism 
condition endorsed egalitarianism values and then in turn were less likely to 
endorse binding foundations (see Table 5 and Figure 4). 
The indirect effect of condition on moral foundations as a difference score 
(individualizing minus binding) through traditionalism was significant for those 
with high choice perception such that those in the increase conservatism condition 
who felt they had a lot of choice when writing their essays endorsed 
traditionalism values and in turn endorsed more binding foundations (see Table 6 
and Figure 5). Also, there was a significant indirect effect of condition on moral 
foundations difference score through egalitarianism such that those in the 
decrease conservatism condition endorsed egalitarianism values and in turn 
endorsed more individualizing foundations (see Table 6 and Figure 5).  
Hypothesis III was partially supported because of significant indirect effects of 
the political ideology manipulation condition on moral foundation endorsement 
through endorsement of traditionalism values for those who perceived high choice 
when writing their essays and through endorsement of egalitarianism values. 
Additional Analyses 
In order to take a closer look at the role that perception of choice and self-
relevance played in determining the efficacy of the political ideology 
manipulation, the manipulation check analysis was computed while eliminating 
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participants who stated that they disagreed with what they wrote about in their 
essays (N = 22).  By removing these participants, we increase our chances that the 
participants who are left are the most personally invested in what they wrote and 
will be more likely to agree with what they wrote about in their essays.  
Participants in the increase conservatism condition reported being significantly 
more socially conservative and Republican compared to those in the decrease 
conservatism condition.  In terms of political attitudes, participants in the increase 
conservatism condition were marginally significantly more conservative in their 
attitudes toward same-sex marriage and warrantless wiretapping (see Table 7). 
The stronger effect of the manipulation also had downstream 
consequences on all of the other analyses where the effects of the manipulation on 
moral foundation endorsement and value endorsement were more robust as well.  
However, while the stronger manipulation enhanced the results, it did not change 
any of the patterns of results from previous analyses.  By eliminating the 
participants who were not personally invested in their arguments, the political 
ideology manipulation did become a little stronger and more robust, further 
exemplifying how important it is for the participant to be personally engaged in 
what they are doing in order for the manipulation to work as well as possible. 
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CHAPTER IX 
DISCUSSION (STUDY 2) 
 The goal of Study 2 was to examine the effect of one’s political ideology 
on the endorsement of moral principles.  Research has shown that adhering to a 
specific political ideology can have many downstream consequences, including 
influencing one’s values and moral principles (Goren, 2005; Jost, Federico, & 
Napier, 2009; Sverdlik, Roccas, & Sagiv, 2012).  While Moral Foundations 
Theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) proposes that moral 
principles or foundations for moral concern result in one’s political ideology, it is 
also just as plausible that one’s political stance could be influencing his/her moral 
outlook.  As in Study 1, values, which are overarching abstract principles that 
serve to guide both our ideologies and our morality (Sverdlik et al., 2012), should 
be able to explain this link between one’s political stance and one’s endorsement 
of specific moral foundations. 
By attempting to experimentally manipulate one’s political ideological 
stance, I predicted that participants who were manipulated to decrease their 
conservatism would tend to endorse moral foundations related to promoting care, 
preventing harm, and promoting fairness and equality (individualizing 
foundations).  At the same time, participants manipulated to increase their 
conservatism would be motivated to endorse moral foundations related to 
respecting authority and maintaining loyalty to one’s ingroup (binding 
foundations).  Along with these predictions, I hypothesized that endorsement of 
abstract values would mediate this association such that those in the decrease 
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conservatism condition would endorse egalitarianism and universalism values, 
which would then lead them to endorse individualizing moral foundations. At the 
same time, those in the increase conservatism condition would endorse 
individualism and traditionalism values, which would then lead them to endorse 
binding moral foundations. 
 In addition to these predictions, I hypothesized that the manipulation 
would only be successful for participants who felt they had a choice when writing 
their essays. By controlling for the perception of choice, the current research is 
better able to examine how the internalization of what the participants were 
writing about had an effect on their abstract value endorsement and moral 
foundation endorsement. Participants who did not perceive any choice when 
writing their essay would be more likely to dismiss what they wrote as something 
they just “had to do” instead of something they actually believed and were 
convinced of (Stone & Cooper, 2001). 
Findings and Implications 
 The political ideology manipulation was partially successful in 
manipulating participants’ ideologies.  Participants in the increase conservatism 
condition reported being marginally significantly more Republican and 
marginally significantly more socially conservative than those in the decrease 
conservatism condition.  However, none of the other political ideology 
manipulation check measures were approaching significance, though most were 
trending in the expected direction.  Therefore, the political ideology manipulation 
was somewhat successful but not very robust as a manipulation. 
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This manipulation was adapted from previous research that was able to 
successfully manipulate conservatism with this task (Solomon & Brown, 2012), 
but perhaps the task could be improved by making the statements that the 
participants have to argue as either true or untrue even more relevant to the self.  
By asking the participants why they think a specific political viewpoint is true or 
untrue, the manipulation would automatically incorporate more of the self for 
each participant, allowing for each person to take more ownership of the 
arguments they provide in their essays.  The manipulation prompt currently 
encourages participants to not express their personal opinion in their writing.  As 
in Study 1, this wording could have given the participants license to divorce their 
actual opinions, thoughts, and feelings from what they wrote.  Instead, one could 
ask the participant to think about a time when something related to the prompt 
happened to them, a family member or friend, or to their community.  Instructing 
the participants to fuel their arguments from real life experiences would make 
them really engaged and invested in what they are writing, which would allow 
more possibility for actually adopting that viewpoint as part of the self.  Of 
course, at the same time, it could be possible that wording the manipulation 
prompt this way could also allow for the participants to just argue their current 
political opinion instead of argue what they are instructed to argue.  By adding 
more of a connection to the self, one is risking this kind of reaction, but it would 
be worth it in order to see if the participants would take more ownership for what 
they argued and therefore take more ownership of that political viewpoint, which 
would allow the manipulation to be stronger. 
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As in Study 1, without the time constraints of the current project, the 
written responses from the manipulation task for Study 2 could be coded for the 
presence of conservative versus liberal political ideology to see if participants 
were really adhering to the task appropriately.  It is conceivable that the 
participants might have regressed into adopting the ideology that they were most 
likely predisposed to endorse (liberalism for the DePaul student sample) before 
participating in the study.  Participants could have been reacting to being asked to 
write about something they disagreed with and therefore, might have written the 
opposite of what they were instructed to write, especially for those in the increase 
conservatism condition. 
In addition, a factor that could have affected the robustness of the ideology 
manipulation was the fact that the manipulation check items included many items 
about ideologically specific policies.  People’s opinions and stances on issues like 
abortion, same-sex marriage, and immigration are typically strongly held attitudes 
(see Skitka, Bauman, and Sargis, 2005).  So not only is it difficult to move around 
their positions on these issues, simply presenting these issues for the participants 
to consider might have countered the effect of the manipulation.  Assuming that 
any effect the manipulation had on anyone’s ideology was most likely to be short-
lived, having the participants state their opinions about hot-button political issues 
might have been more powerful than the manipulation and might have caused the 
participants to revert back, at least a little, to their original ideological positions 
by the time they responded to the abstract values and moral foundations items.  It 
would be worthwhile to consider running the same manipulation but with only 
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general social and economic political ideology measures as manipulation check 
items in order to avoid any contamination of the manipulation with cantankerous 
issues. 
 An important finding in the current study is that participants who were 
asked to write about why specific conservative ideological stances were incorrect 
or untrue ended up endorsing the individualizing moral foundations more than the 
binding foundations, while participants who were asked to write in favor of 
conservative ideological stances endorsed the binding moral foundations more so 
than those in the other condition.  These results support the idea that one’s view of 
how society should function can have an impact on one’s locus of moral concern.  
Having a specific ideological viewpoint made salient can provide a heuristic for 
determining one’s moral concerns.  If one’s political ideology emphasizes a fear 
of change, justifies inequality, and esteems self-reliance (i.e. conservatism) then 
that person is going to be more likely to base ideas of right and wrong off of 
concerns related to benefitting the ingroup (to avoid the unknown of outgroup 
members) and respecting hierarchy (to avoid upsetting the natural state of 
inequality) than someone who has a political viewpoint that welcomes societal 
change and has a place for situational accounts for one’s standing in life (i.e. 
liberalism).   
 In terms of political ideology and abstract value endorsement, writing 
about why specific conservative ideological stances were untrue did cause 
participants to endorse egalitarianism and universalism values more so than 
individualism and traditionalism values, but writing in support of specific 
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conservative ideologies did not influence participants’ value endorsements to the 
same extent.  This finding is interesting, especially in tandem with the previous 
finding that ideology affects moral concerns, because it may point to the fact that 
one’s values may function more as an organizer for our ideology and moral 
concerns.  When looking at values as abstract, overarching principles that guide 
behaviors, beliefs, and intentions that include concerns about morality as well as 
personal goals and desires, one can see how values are not solely determined by 
one’s ideology or one’s moral stance.  The abstract nature of values may allow for 
changes in moral concerns to occur without sacrificing or changing the 
overarching value that drives it.  If a person has a conservative ideology made 
salient and personally relevant to them and therefore places more importance in 
basing judgments of right and wrong on whether someone betrayed their ingroup, 
that person can still espouse an abstract value of egalitarianism and simply use it 
to guide other aspects of their behavior. One does not necessarily need to throw 
the abstract value baby out with the morality bathwater.  However, as we see in 
the mediation analyses, imbuing the self in one’s ideological stance may be the 
key component in adhering to the values associated with that ideology. 
 In all three moderated mediation models (outcome variable consisting of 
individualizing foundation endorsement, binding foundation endorsement, and the 
difference score, see Figures 3, 4, and 5) manipulation condition significantly 
predicted endorsement of egalitarianism values.  The interaction between 
manipulation and perception of choice predicted endorsement of traditionalism 
values as well.  In all three models, endorsement of egalitarianism values 
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predicted endorsement of individualizing moral foundations.  In models 2 and 3 
(see Figures 4 and 5) endorsement of traditionalism also predicted endorsement of 
binding moral foundations. 
However, more interestingly, there were significant indirect effects of 
manipulation condition on endorsement of moral foundations through certain 
abstract values.  In all three models, there were significant indirect effects of 
manipulation condition on endorsement of individualizing foundations through 
egalitarianism, regardless of perception of choice.  In other words, participants in 
the decrease conservatism condition endorsed egalitarianism values, which led to 
an endorsement of the individualizing foundations.  This finding is not necessarily 
surprising due to the fact that most of the participants were likely to already 
endorse egalitarianism values by virtue of being a liberal university student 
sample.  So when these participants argue an ideological viewpoint that 
strengthens a liberal worldview, the abstract values that guide that point of view 
are brought to mind and endorsed.  As a result of having the egalitarianism values 
brought to mind, these participants then lean toward endorsing the individualizing 
foundations as these foundations are easily identifiable as manifestations of 
egalitarian values.  At the same time, having egalitarian values in mind prohibits 
these individuals from endorsing binding moral foundations since having a 
respect for authority and hierarchy does not jibe well with values that promote 
equality. 
In the last two models there were significant indirect effects of 
manipulation condition on endorsement of binding foundations through 
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traditionalism values but only for participants who perceived a high amount of 
choice when writing their essays.  This is where imbuing the self may become a 
key component in the chain of association.  Undoubtedly, given the liberal bias in 
the sample, participants in the increase conservatism condition would have had 
the greatest chance of having to argue a point with which they did not necessarily 
agree.  This makes it possible that some participants would not have felt 
personally invested in their argument, thus making it less successful.  However, 
for those participants who did feel that they were able to imbue a sense of self into 
their arguments, the manipulation would be much stronger.  This is exactly what 
we find in Study 2.  Participants in the increase conservatism condition who felt 
they had a lot of choice in writing their essays were more likely to espouse a 
conservative political viewpoint, which made traditionalism values salient.  As a 
result of having traditionalism values brought to mind, these individuals then used 
that guiding, overarching value to inform their moral concerns, thus making them 
more likely to endorse binding moral foundations, which are easily informed by 
traditionalism.  And this link from conservative political ideology to endorsement 
of traditionalism does not lead to a decrease in individualizing foundation 
endorsement because both conservatives and liberals can and do endorse 
individualizing foundations (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). 
An important point to consider when examining the results of these 
analyses, especially the path models, is how much these associations are causally 
related.  Path models with directional arrows make it tempting to argue that 
political ideology is causing one to endorse a specific moral outlook.  However, it 
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might more likely be the case that these different moral foundations are already 
endorsed to a certain degree within all of us.  So conservative political ideology 
may not be causing someone to develop a moral outlook focused on binding 
foundations, but may instead cause that person to just reprioritize the level of 
importance that one places on those foundations.  In a sense, political ideology 
primes individuals into thinking about the world in a specific way, which then 
leads to a reorganization of moral concerns to coalesce around that ideology. 
Conclusion 
 The current study was able to shed some light on the relationship between 
political ideology and endorsement of moral principles.  The data reveal that a 
relationship does exist between these two constructs and that this relationship is at 
least partially explained by the values that one endorses.  Individuals who are put 
in a mindset that forces them to endorse a conservative political ideology tend to 
endorse moral principles related to concerns about group-level morality, placing 
value in respecting authorities and maintaining loyalty to one’s ingroup more so 
than someone who is put in a mindset that forces them to endorse a liberal 
political ideology.  This relationship between conservatism and group-based 
morality is at least partially explained by an endorsement of traditionalism values, 
which are associated with conservatism and with group-based morality.  At the 
same time, individuals forced to endorse a liberal political ideology tend to 
endorse individual-level morality, placing value in caring for the individual, 
preventing harm, and promoting fairness and equality more so than someone who 
is put in a conservative mindset.  This relationship is partially accounted for by 
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endorsement of egalitarianism values, which are associated with liberalism and 
with individual-based morality.  While the results of Study 2 are not completely 
conclusive, they get us on the right track to further discovering the complex 
relationship between ideology, morality, and values. 
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CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSION 
 Much research has examined the association between political ideology 
and endorsement of distinct moral principles (e.g. Goren, 2005; Haidt & Graham, 
2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004).  The associations that have typically been observed 
show that political liberals tend to endorse moral principles that place the 
individual at the center of concern, resulting in judgments of right and wrong 
based on caring for individuals and promoting fairness (individualizing 
foundations); while political conservatives tend to endorse moral principles that 
include the group as an equally worthy recipient of concern and priority (binding 
foundations), resulting in moral judgments based on maintaining and preserving 
important traditions, hierarchies, and social systems as well as caring for 
individuals and promoting fairness (Moral Foundations Theory, Haidt & Graham, 
2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004).  However, research has also shown that 
endorsement of certain moral principles could be a result of adhering to specific 
political ideologies (i.e. liberalism versus conservatism) (Goren, 2005; Jost, 
Federico, & Napier, 2009).  In addition, research has also shown that endorsement 
of abstract values, or overarching principles that guide our behavior, our judgment 
of others’ behavior, and assist us in explaining our choices, actions, beliefs, and 
intentions (e.g. universalism, egalitarianism, traditionalism, Schwartz, 1992), are 
associated with both political ideology and with endorsement of moral principles 
(Sverdlik, Roccas, & Sagiv, 2012). 
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 One goal of the current research was to provide an experimental test of the 
causal link between moral foundations endorsement and political ideology in the 
direction predicted by moral foundations theory researchers (morals to ideology), 
and in the direction predicted by some political science researchers (ideology to 
morals).  This goal was important because Moral Foundations Theory has 
generated a lot of interest and discussion within moral and political psychology 
research.  Moreover, the claims made by MFT researchers, especially when it 
comes to associations between moral foundation endorsement and political 
ideology, have not necessarily been subject to explicit experimentation.  
Theoretically driven hypotheses like these need to be tested with experimental 
control rather than based on assumptions and speculation.  Another goal of the 
current research was to propose a role for abstract value endorsements as a 
mediator between both the morals-to-ideology link and the ideology-to-morals 
link.  In order to accomplish these goals, I conducted two studies that each 
examined one direction of the causal link between political ideology and 
endorsement of moral principles.  Study 1 manipulated endorsement of moral 
foundations (increase individualizing foundations versus increase binding 
foundations) through a writing task and measured responses to questions 
assessing abstract value endorsement and political ideology.  Study 2 manipulated 
endorsement of political ideology (increase conservatism versus decrease 
conservatism), also through a writing task, and measured responses to abstract 
values and moral foundations questions. 
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 Taken together, the current research provides us with a number of insights 
into the world of morality, values, and political ideology.  For one, manipulating 
one’s locus of moral concern is a difficult task.  Individuals often have extreme 
feelings and attitudes associated with their moral stances and getting someone to 
let go of or adjust a moral principle seems to require a high level of motivation 
and self relevance.  Given the high level of specificity and personal relevance that 
would be needed to make a convincing argument for one to adjust their moral 
stance, the field of morality research would benefit from developing a clear and 
effective way to manipulate one’s moral stance.  This would allow for more 
nuanced and thorough investigation in to the role of morality in human behavior.  
The current research was not entirely successful at manipulating moral principle 
endorsement, but given the critiques and suggestions for future research to 
implicate the self more when arguing a specific moral stance, a more effective 
manipulation seems possible to attain. 
 On the other hand, the current research was able to show that manipulating 
one’s political ideological stance may not be as difficult as once thought.  While 
personal relevance and motivation are factors in determining what sort of 
ideology one will endorse much in the same way that they inform one’s moral 
stance, perhaps there is some leeway in ideology as far as leaving room for 
alternative points of view.  Unlike morality, political ideology does not have the 
same objective and universal demands that prevent someone from considering 
another viewpoint.  Instead, if one can be highly motivated and encouraged to be 
personally invested in a specific ideological tenet, then that person may be more 
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amenable to self-identifying a shift to a political orientation that corresponds with 
that new tenet. 
Finally, the current research was able to show that abstract values seem to 
influence and predict both political ideological tendencies and tendencies for 
basing moral judgments off of specific moral concerns.  So one could say that 
abstract values play an important role in shaping and defining both how we view 
society and how we make judgments regarding morality.  And because values are 
overarching and broad, they also seem to be difficult to change, even in the face 
of a slight shift in endorsement of certain moral principles or shift in ideological 
stance.  Values can be seen as somewhat of a constant force that holds a certain 
amount of imperviousness to the changing tides of ideological preferences and 
moral principles that people experience throughout their lives.  While values are 
certainly subject to change given the right circumstances, they also provide a way 
of keeping consistency between our ideologies and our moral penchants.  Since 
values have shown in the current research to influence both political ideology and 
endorsement of moral principles, it may be the case that values are more self-
relevant than ideology or morality.  If values are more a core part of the self, then 
we may reorient our moral stances and ideological opinions to be more in line 
with our value system which could possibly explain some of the results of the 
current research where value endorsement has this dual influence on ideology and 
morals. 
Practical Implications 
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Along with trying to understand what is happening on a theoretical level in 
the interplay between political ideology, values, and morals, it is perhaps just as 
important to consider practical, real-life implications of the results of the current 
research.  I think that these data provide a window for looking at what is 
happening in the current political climate in the United States.  In a somewhat 
sinister fashion, if people can use ideology to get others to reprioritize their moral 
concerns, as is suggested by the current research, then that could provide a lot 
more leverage for pushing ideological positions.  We already see this sort of tactic 
used by our elected officials where almost all policy issues are couched in 
different moral terms depending on which political party is endorsing them.  
Therefore, this could create an almost cyclical effect where persuading someone 
to adopt a certain position on an ideological level then leads that person to adapt 
their moral outlook to further solidify that opinion which then strengthens that 
position ideologically. 
On the other hand, the current research could also suggest that such 
extreme ideological divides that we see in the current political context are not 
necessarily intransigent.  Under the right circumstances, individuals can be 
motivated to take alternative points of view, ideologically, which could allow for 
greater compromise and cooperation between political extremes.  If it is the case 
that everyone endorses all abstract values and all moral foundations just to 
varying degrees, then it might be easier to get people to realign those values and 
morals than previously thought.  Finding a way to make such differing opinions 
and alternative viewpoints personally relevant to the self might be the key for 
 81	  
sparking ideological compromise and open-mindedness.  Future research could 
benefit from taking the self into account when examining the complex 
relationships between ideology, morality, and values. 
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Table 1 
 
Study 1 ANCOVA Results for Testing Mean Differences between Experimental 
Conditions for all Political Ideology Measures 
            
 
              Individualizing  Binding 
                       
 
    Measure     F dfn   dfd      p   ηp2        M (SE)        M (SE) 
            
 
Social Issuesa   2.40 1    103    .12    .02      3.18 (.18)    2.78 (.19) 
Economic Issuesa  1.12 1    101    .29    .01      3.66 (.19)    3.36 (.20) 
General Party IDa  5.28 1    102    .02    .05      3.50 (.17)    2.93 (.18) 
Abortiona   0.01 1    103    .95    .00      3.19 (.22)    3.21 (.23) 
Warrantless Wiretappinga 0.68 1    103    .41    .01      3.63 (.18)    3.42 (.19) 
Free Enterprisea  0.25 1    103    .62    .00      4.01 (.15)    3.90 (.16) 
 
Same-Sex Marriageb  0.02 1    103    .88    .00      5.93 (.19)    5.89 (.20) 
Immigrationb   0.16 1    103    .69    .00      4.97 (.16)    5.06 (.16) 
Government Assistanceb 0.20 1    103    .66    .00      5.29 (.15)    5.39 (.16) 
 
Mean Totala   1.64 1    103    .20    .02      3.22 (.10)    3.03 (.11) 
            
Note. Means are estimated marginal means controlling for perception of choice. 
aHigher scores indicate greater conservatism. 
bHigher scores indicate greater liberalism. 
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Table 2 
 
Study 1 Indirect Effects and Confidence Intervals for Multiple Mediation Model of 
Experimental Condition Predicting Political Ideology 
            
 
             Political Ideology 
                     
  
 Abstract Value    Indirect Effect (SE)          95% CI 
            
 
Egalitarianism            .06 (.11)         [-.14, .29] 
Universalism            .001 (.03)         [-.06, .07] 
Individualism           -.0002 (.01)        [-.03, .02] 
Traditionalism           -.02 (.06)         [-.14, .08] 
            
Note. CI = confidence interval. 
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Table 3 
 
Study 2 ANCOVA Results for Testing Mean Differences between Experimental 
Conditions for all Political Ideology Measures 
            
 
              Decrease       Increase 
          Conservatism Conservatism 
                        
 
    Measure     F dfn  dfd      p     ηp2        M (SE)        M (SE) 
            
 
Social Issuesa   3.25 1    82    .08    .04      2.55 (.21)    3.06 (.19) 
Economic Issuesa  0.41 1    82    .53    .01      3.16 (.21)    3.34 (.19) 
General Party IDa  2.83 1    81    .10    .03      2.72 (.21)    3.22 (.20) 
Abortiona   0.001 1    82    .97    .00      3.12 (.25)    3.11 (.23) 
Warrantless Wiretappinga 1.16 1    82    .29    .01      3.48 (.21)    3.79 (.19) 
Free Enterprisea  1.57 1    82    .21    .02      3.75 (.16)    4.02 (.14) 
 
Same-Sex Marriageb  0.36 1    82    .55    .00      6.27 (.18)    6.12 (.17) 
Immigrationb   0.24 1    82    .62    .00      5.20 (.18)    5.32 (.17) 
Government Assistanceb 1.10 1    82    .30    .01      5.69 (.18)    5.44 (.16) 
 
Mean Totala   2.25 1    82    .14    .03      2.85 (.11)    3.07 (.10) 
            
Note. Means are estimated marginal means controlling for perception of choice. 
aHigher scores indicate greater conservatism. 
bHigher scores indicate greater liberalism. 
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Table 4 
 
Study 2 Indirect Effects and Confidence Intervals for Multiple Mediation Model of 
Experimental Condition Predicting Individualizing Moral Foundations 
            
 
        Individualizing Moral Foundations 
                     
  
 Abstract Value    Indirect Effect (SE)          95% CI 
            
 
Egalitarianism            .14 (.08)         [ .02, .33] 
Universalism           -.01 (.05)         [-.14, .07] 
Individualism           -.02 (.03)         [-.15, .02] 
Traditionalism  
 Low Choice          -.001 (.03)         [-.04, .07] 
 Average Choice         -.001 (.02)         [-.07, .04] 
 High Choice          -.004 (.05)         [-.13, .09] 
            
Note. CI = confidence interval. Low choice and high choice are -1 SD and +1 SD, 
respectively, from the mean level of choice for participants. 
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Table 5 
 
Study 2 Indirect Effects and Confidence Intervals for Multiple Mediation Model of 
Experimental Condition Predicting Binding Moral Foundations 
            
 
              Binding Moral Foundations 
                     
  
 Abstract Value    Indirect Effect (SE)          95% CI 
            
 
Egalitarianism           -.10 (.06)        [-.26, -.01] 
Universalism           -.01 (.03)         [-.11, .04] 
Individualism            .03 (.05)         [-.02, .17] 
Traditionalism  
 Low Choice           .04 (.07)         [-.06, .22] 
 Average Choice         -.04 (.05)         [-.16, .03] 
 High Choice          -.13 (.08)        [-.33, -.02] 
            
Note. CI = confidence interval. Low choice and high choice are -1 SD and +1 SD, 
respectively, from the mean level of choice for participants. 
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Table 6 
 
Study 2 Indirect Effects and Confidence Intervals for Multiple Mediation Model of 
Experimental Condition Predicting Moral Foundations Difference Score 
            
 
       Moral Foundations Difference Score 
                     
  
 Abstract Value    Indirect Effect (SE)          95% CI 
            
 
Egalitarianism            .24 (.12)         [ .05, .55] 
Universalism           -.003 (.03)         [-.12, .04] 
Individualism           -.05 (.07)         [-.27, .02] 
Traditionalism  
 Low Choice          -.04 (.08)         [-.25, .06] 
 Average Choice          .04 (.05)         [-.02, .16] 
 High Choice           .13 (.08)         [ .01, .35] 
            
Note. CI = confidence interval. Low choice and high choice are -1 SD and +1 SD, 
respectively, from the mean level of choice for participants. 
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Table 7 
 
Study 2 ANCOVA Results for Testing Mean Differences between Conditions for 
all Political Ideology Measures with Participants who Agreed with their Essays 
            
 
              Decrease       Increase 
          Conservatism Conservatism 
                                   
 
    Measure     F dfn  dfd     p ηp2 M (SE)        M (SE) 
            
 
Social Issuesa   5.26 1    60    .03    .08      2.54 (.22)    3.32 (.26) 
Economic Issuesa  1.51 1    60    .22    .03      3.19 (.22)    3.61 (.26) 
General Party IDa  5.76 1    59    .02    .09      2.81 (.22)    3.65 (.27) 
Abortiona   0.10 1    60    .76    .00      3.08 (.27)    2.95 (.32) 
Warrantless Wiretappinga 2.89 1    60    .09    .05      3.53 (.21)    4.09 (.25) 
Free Enterprisea  2.13 1    60    .15    .03      3.72 (.15)    4.07 (.18) 
 
Same-Sex Marriageb  2.85 1    60    .09    .05      6.33 (.19)    5.83 (.23) 
Immigrationb   0.13 1    60    .72    .00      5.15 (.20)    5.25 (.23) 
Government Assistanceb 1.31 1    60    .26    .02      5.69 (.19)    5.35 (.23) 
 
Mean Totala   4.96 1    60    .03    .08      2.86 (.11)    3.25 (.14) 
            
Note. Means are estimated marginal means controlling for perception of choice. 
aHigher scores indicate greater conservatism. 
bHigher scores indicate greater liberalism. 
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Figure 1. Path coefficients for multiple mediation model showing the effect of 
moral foundation manipulation on political ideology (composite score for all 
ideology measures, higher scores indicated more conservatism), mediated by 
endorsement of abstract values. Solid paths indicate p < .05; Dashed paths 
indicate non-significant paths (p > .05). Coefficients are unstandardized slopes 
(SE). 
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Figure 2. Mixed model ANOVA interaction showing political ideology condition 
and type of moral foundation predicting endorsement of moral foundations (* p < 
.05, + p < .10). 
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Figure 3. Path coefficients for moderated mediation model showing the effect of 
political ideology manipulation on endorsement of individualizing moral 
foundations (composite score for Care/Harm and Fairness/Reciprocity 
foundations) mediated by endorsement of abstract values. For the mediated path 
through Traditionalism, perception of choice moderates the relationship. Solid 
paths indicate p < .05; Dashed paths indicate non-significant paths (p > .05). 
Coefficients are unstandardized slopes (SE). 
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Figure 4. Path coefficients for moderated mediation model showing the effect of 
political ideology manipulation on endorsement of binding moral foundations 
(composite score for Authority/Respect and Ingroup/Loyalty foundations) 
mediated by endorsement of abstract values. For the mediated path through 
Traditionalism, perception of choice moderates the relationship. Solid paths 
indicate p < .05; Dashed paths indicate non-significant paths (p > .05). 
Coefficients are unstandardized slopes (SE). 
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Figure 5. Path coefficients for moderated mediation model showing the effect of 
political ideology manipulation on endorsement of moral foundations (difference 
score for Care/Harm and Fairness/Reciprocity foundations minus 
Authority/Respect and Ingroup/Loyalty foundations) mediated by endorsement of 
abstract values. For the mediated path through Traditionalism, perception of 
choice moderates the relationship. Solid paths indicate p < .05; Dashed paths 
indicate non-significant paths (p > .05). Coefficients are unstandardized slopes 
(SE). 
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Appendix A 
Moral Foundations Endorsement Manipulation 
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Increase Endorsement of Binding Foundations Condition 
 
In the space below, please write an essay (1-2 paragraphs) about how each of 
these actions or ideas are morally wrong. We are not asking for your personal 
opinion at this time, rather, simply think of a logical argument for why these 
points of view could be morally wrong. 
 
-Betraying one’s group (e.g. family, friends, etc.) 
 
-Disrespecting (or going against) a legitimate authority (e.g. parents, 
bosses, teachers, etc.) 
 
 
Increase Endorsement of Individualizing Foundations Condition 
 
In the space below, please write an essay (1-2 paragraphs) about how each of 
these actions or ideas are morally wrong. We are not asking for your personal 
opinion at this time, rather, simply think of a logical argument for why these 
points of view could be morally wrong. 
 
-Harming an individual (e.g. violence) 
 
-Cheating someone (e.g. taking something away from someone when you 
don’t deserve it) 	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Appendix B 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire 
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Part	  1.	  When	  you	  decide	  whether	  something	  is	  right	  or	  wrong,	  to	  what	  extent	  are	  the	  following	  considerations	  relevant	  to	  your	  thinking?	  Please	  rate	  each	  statement	  using	  this	  scale:	  [0]	  =	  not	  at	  all	  relevant	  (This	  consideration	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  my	  judgments	  of	  right	  and	  wrong)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [1]	  =	  not	  very	  relevant	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [2]	  =	  slightly	  relevant	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [3]	  =	  somewhat	  relevant	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [4]	  =	  very	  relevant	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [5]	  =	  extremely	  relevant	  (This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  factors	  when	  I	  judge	  right	  and	  wrong)	  	  ______Whether	  or	  not	  someone	  suffered	  emotionally	  	  ______Whether	  or	  not	  some	  people	  were	  treated	  differently	  than	  others	  ______Whether	  or	  not	  someone’s	  action	  showed	  love	  for	  his	  or	  her	  country	  ______Whether	  or	  not	  someone	  showed	  a	  lack	  of	  respect	  for	  authority	  	  ______Whether	  or	  not	  someone	  violated	  standards	  of	  purity	  and	  decency	  ______Whether	  or	  not	  someone	  was	  good	  at	  math	  ______Whether	  or	  not	  someone	  cared	  for	  someone	  weak	  or	  vulnerable	  ______Whether	  or	  not	  someone	  acted	  unfairly	  ______Whether	  or	  not	  someone	  did	  something	  to	  betray	  his	  or	  her	  group	  ______Whether	  or	  not	  someone	  conformed	  to	  the	  traditions	  of	  society	  	  ______Whether	  or	  not	  someone	  did	  something	  disgusting	  ______Whether	  or	  not	  someone	  was	  cruel	  ______Whether	  or	  not	  someone	  was	  denied	  his	  or	  her	  rights	  ______Whether	  or	  not	  someone	  showed	  a	  lack	  of	  loyalty	  ______Whether	  or	  not	  an	  action	  caused	  chaos	  or	  disorder	  ______Whether	  or	  not	  someone	  acted	  in	  a	  way	  that	  God	  would	  approve	  of	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Part	  2.	  Please	  read	  the	  following	  sentences	  and	  indicate	  your	  agreement	  or	  disagreement:	  	   [0]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [1]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [2]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [3]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [4]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [5]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Moderately	  	  	  	  	  	  Slightly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Slightly	  	  	  	  	  	  Moderately	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  	  	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  	  ______Compassion	  for	  those	  who	  are	  suffering	  is	  the	  most	  crucial	  virtue.	  ______When	  the	  government	  makes	  laws,	  the	  number	  one	  principle	  should	  be	  ensuring	  that	  everyone	  is	  treated	  fairly.	  	  ______I	  am	  proud	  of	  my	  country’s	  history.	  ______Respect	  for	  authority	  is	  something	  all	  children	  need	  to	  learn.	  ______People	  should	  not	  do	  things	  that	  are	  disgusting,	  even	  if	  no	  one	  is	  harmed.	  	  ______It	  is	  better	  to	  do	  good	  than	  to	  do	  bad.	  ______One	  of	  the	  worst	  things	  a	  person	  could	  do	  is	  hurt	  a	  defenseless	  animal.	  ______Justice	  is	  the	  most	  important	  requirement	  for	  a	  society.	  ______People	  should	  be	  loyal	  to	  their	  family	  members,	  even	  when	  they	  have	  done	  something	  wrong.	  	  	  	  ______Men	  and	  women	  each	  have	  different	  roles	  to	  play	  in	  society.	  ______I	  would	  call	  some	  acts	  wrong	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  they	  are	  unnatural.	  ______It	  can	  never	  be	  right	  to	  kill	  a	  human	  being.	  ______I	  think	  it’s	  morally	  wrong	  that	  rich	  children	  inherit	  a	  lot	  of	  money	  while	  poor	  children	  inherit	  nothing.	  	  ______It	  is	  more	  important	  to	  be	  a	  team	  player	  than	  to	  express	  oneself.	  ______If	  I	  were	  a	  soldier	  and	  disagreed	  with	  my	  commanding	  officer’s	  orders,	  I	  would	  obey	  anyway	  because	  that	  is	  my	  duty.	  	  ______	  Chastity	  is	  an	  important	  and	  valuable	  virtue.	  The	  Moral	  Foundations	  Questionnaire	  (full	  version,	  July	  2008)	  by	  Jesse	  Graham,	  Jonathan	  Haidt,	  and	  Brian	  Nosek. 	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Appendix C 
Abstract Values Measures 
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Egalitarianism 
 I	  believe	  that	  everyone	  should	  have	  an	  equal	  chance	  in	  life.	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 I	  believe	  that	  society	  should	  do	  more	  to	  lessen	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  rich	  and	  the	  poor.	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 I	  think	  it	  is	  important	  that	  there	  is	  equality	  for	  everyone.	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 
Universalism 
 I	  think	  it	  is	  important	  to	  be	  tolerant	  of	  different	  ideas	  and	  beliefs.	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 I	  think	  it	  is	  important	  to	  try	  to	  work	  in	  harmony	  with	  others.	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 I	  think	  it	  is	  important	  to	  have	  a	  world	  free	  of	  conflict.	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 
Individualism 
 I	  think	  it	  is	  important	  to	  put	  forth	  effort	  to	  get	  ahead.	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 I	  find	  it	  important	  to	  be	  self-­‐reliant.	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 I	  think	  it	  is	  important	  to	  work	  hard	  in	  life.	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	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Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 
Traditionalism 
 I	  think	  it	  is	  important	  to	  adhere	  to	  traditional	  values	  (e.g.	  time-­‐honored	  beliefs	  and	  customs).	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 I	  believe	  that	  the	  traditions	  of	  the	  past	  should	  be	  respected.	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 I	  think	  it	  is	  important	  that	  we	  follow	  long	  held-­‐social	  customs.	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	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Political Ideology Measures (General) 
 When	  it	  comes	  to	  social	  issues,	  do	  you	  usually	  think	  of	  yourself	  as	  liberal,	  conservative,	  or	  moderate?	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  liberal	  	  	  Moderate,	  leaning	  	  	  	  Moderate	  	  	  Moderate,	  leaning	  	  	  	  conservative	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  liberal	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  toward	  liberal	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  toward	  conservative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  conservative	  	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  economic	  issues,	  do	  you	  usually	  think	  of	  yourself	  as	  liberal,	  conservative,	  or	  moderate?	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  liberal	  	  	  Moderate,	  leaning	  	  	  	  Moderate	  	  	  Moderate,	  leaning	  	  	  	  conservative	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  liberal	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  toward	  liberal	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  toward	  conservative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  conservative	  	  
 
Political Ideology Measures (Issue Specific) 	  
Same-sex Marriage (Higher scores indicate more liberalism) 	  Gay	  or	  lesbian	  couples	  should	  have	  the	  same	  legal	  rights	  as	  heterosexual	  couples.	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 Laws	  should	  be	  passed	  to	  prohibit	  marriage	  between	  individuals	  of	  the	  same	  sex.	  (Reverse	  scored)	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 Marriage	  should	  be	  defined	  as	  only	  between	  one	  man	  and	  one	  woman.	  (Reverse	  scored)	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 
Abortion (Higher scores indicate more conservatism) 	  I	  support	  the	  right	  to	  life	  for	  unborn	  children.	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 Abortion	  should	  be	  a	  legal	  choice.	  (Reverse	  coded)	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	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I	  am	  opposed	  to	  abortion	  rights.	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 
Immigration (Higher scores indicate more liberalism) 
 Immigrants	  contribute	  more	  to	  our	  society	  than	  we	  give	  them	  credit	  for.	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 Legally	  admitted	  immigrants	  who	  can’t	  find	  jobs	  should	  be	  sent	  back	  to	  their	  countries.	  (Reverse	  coded)	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 The	  United	  States	  needs	  to	  relax	  its	  immigration	  requirements.	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 
Warrantless Wiretapping (Higher scores indicate more conservatism) 
 In	  their	  fight	  against	  crime	  the	  police	  should	  be	  entitled	  to	  use	  wiretaps	  and	  other	  devices	  for	  listening	  in	  on	  private	  conversations.	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 The	  government	  should	  be	  permitted	  to	  use	  warrantless	  wiretapping	  in	  order	  to	  get	  information	  on	  suspected	  terrorists.	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 Warrantless	  wiretapping	  should	  be	  outlawed	  in	  its	  entirety.	  (Reverse	  coded)	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 
Government Assistance (Higher scores indicate more liberalism) 	  The	  government	  should	  set	  up	  programs	  to	  help	  the	  poor.	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	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The	  government	  should	  provide	  fewer	  services	  in	  such	  areas	  as	  health	  and	  education.	  (Reverse	  coded)	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 The	  government	  should	  see	  to	  it	  that	  every	  person	  has	  a	  job	  and	  a	  good	  standard	  of	  living.	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 
Free Enterprise (Higher scores indicate more conservatism) 	  The	  less	  government	  gets	  involved	  with	  business	  and	  the	  economy,	  the	  better	  off	  this	  country	  will	  be.	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 There	  should	  be	  no	  government	  interference	  with	  business	  and	  trade.	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 Government	  intervention	  leads	  to	  too	  much	  red	  tape	  and	  too	  many	  problems.	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	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Control Variables 
 
Perception of Choice 	  How	  freely	  could	  you	  express	  yourself	  when	  writing	  your	  essays?	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Not	  at	  all	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	  	  	  Very	  much	  	  	  
 To	  what	  extent	  do	  you	  feel	  that	  you	  had	  any	  control	  when	  writing	  your	  essays?	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Not	  at	  all	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	  	  	  Very	  much	  	  	  
 How	  much	  did	  you	  identify	  with	  what	  you	  wrote	  about	  in	  your	  essays?	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Not	  at	  all	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	  	  	  Very	  much	  	  	  
 
Other control variables 
 To	  what	  extent	  do	  you	  agree	  with	  what	  you	  wrote	  about	  in	  your	  essays?	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  disagree	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agree	  
 How	  easy	  was	  it	  for	  you	  to	  come	  up	  with	  your	  arguments	  in	  your	  essays?	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Very	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Difficult	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  difficult	  	  	  	  	  Neutral	  	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  easy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Easy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Very	  	  	  difficult	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  easy	  
 
 
Demographics 
 What	  is	  your	  gender?	  1	  –	  Male	   	   2	  –	  Female	   	   3	  –	  Other	  
 What	  is	  your	  ethnicity?	  <1>	   White/Caucasian	   	   <6>	  	  	  	  	  	  Native	  American	  	  	   <2>	   Middle	  Eastern	   	   <7>	   East	  Indian/	  Pakistani	  	  <3>	   Latino	  /	  a	   	   	   <8>	   Multiracial	  (Please	  specify)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  <4>	   African-­‐American/Black	   <9>	   Other	  (Please	  specify)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  <5>	   Asian	  or	  Pacific	  Islander	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 What	  is	  your	  age?	  __________	  
 What	  is	  your	  religion?	  <1>	  Christian	  (e.g.	  Catholic,	  Orthodox,	  Protestant,	  non-­‐denominational,	  etc.)	  
 118	  
	   <2>	  Buddhist	  	   <3>	  Muslim	  	   <4>	  Hindu	  	   <5>	  Jewish	  	   <6>	  Atheist	  	   <7>	  Other	  (please	  specify)________________________________	  
 Generally	  speaking,	  do	  you	  usually	  think	  of	  yourself	  as	  Republican,	  Democrat,	  or	  Independent?	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Strongly	  	  	  	  Democrat	  	  	  	  	  Independent,	  	  	  	  	  Independent	  	  	  	  	  Independent,	  	  	  	  	  Republican	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  	  	  Democrat	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  leaning	  toward	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  leaning	  toward	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Republican	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Democrat	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Republican	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Increase Conservatism Condition 
 
Below are some political viewpoints. In the space below, please write an essay (1-
2 paragraphs) about how these particular political viewpoints are correct or true.  
We are not asking for your personal opinion at this time, rather, simply think of a 
logical argument for why these points of view could be correct or true. 
 
-Everyone is responsible for their own standing in life. 
 
-Inequality that exists in the world is there for a reason. 
 
-Change in society is usually a bad thing. 
 
 
Decrease Conservatism Condition 
 
Below are some political viewpoints. In the space below, please write an essay (1-
2 paragraphs) about how each of these particular political viewpoints are incorrect 
or untrue.  We are not asking for your personal opinion at this time, rather, simply 
think of a logical argument for why these points of view could be incorrect or 
untrue. 
 
-Everyone is responsible for their own standing in life. 
 
-Inequality that exists in the world is there for a reason. 
 
-Change in society is usually a bad thing. 
